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Abstract

Hegemonic stability theory been the focus of substantial scholarly attention
in recent years.

Hegemonic stability theory is a theory that attempts to explain

changes in the degree to which the international political economy is "open" or
"restricted" on the basis of the power relations between the major states in the
world system.

Specifically, the theory holds that markets will tend to be most

open when one state is clearly predominant, particularly in terms of economic
power, and, conversely, that markets will tend to be restricted when there is no
predominant power.

From the end of World War II until the late 1960s or early 1970s, the
United States was the hegemonic power in the world economy.

The U.S. was

particularly predominant in the period from 1945 through roughly 1960.

Since

the early 1960s, the U.S. has gradually lost position relative to that of other
major economic powers.

If the theory of hegemonic stability is valid, this should

cause trade levels to decline as a percentage of aggregate economic activity.
This dissertation presents a general examination of hegemonic stability
theory.

This includes discussion of different variants of the theory, as well as

discussion of the internal logic of the theory.

Hegemonic stability theory is tested

statistically, utilizing the case of American hegemony in the post World War II
period.

Finally, the findings of the statistical test are discussed in terms of their

implications for the international political economy of the coming decades.

vi

Introduction

This dissertation examines the "theory of hegemonic stability."
stability is a

Hegemonic

theoretical perspective that is concerned with international trade

policy. Specifically, this theory is concerned with the relationship between the level
of economic power of the dominant state in the international economy (when one
state clearly is dom inant), and the degree to which international trade increases
or decreases.
I present an examination of hegemonic stability which begins with a basic
presentation of the theory, and a critique of some of the other works related to
the theory.

This necessarily includes a discussion of concepts such as "free trade"

and "public goods," as these concepts are central to the theory of hegemonic
stability. I also present a statistical test of the theory, and discuss the implications
of the results thus derived for the international economy of the coming several
decades.
An examination of hegemonic stability theory may be useful in understanding
the trading policies of states of all levels of development.

The central question

w ith which the theory is concerned is under what conditions the core, or the most
developed states, maintain relatively open trading policies.

This in turn has a

significant effect upon the trading policies of peripheral, or less developed states,
as well as upon the trading policies of semi-peripheral states, or states at a
medium level of development.

Finally, as will be made evident, hegemonic

stability theory has important general implications for the world political economy.

1

This dissertation will be set forth in five chapters.

Chapter One presents

the theory of hegemonic stability with an emphasis upon the central tenants of
the theory.

In Chapter Two I consider the major w ork that has been done to

date regarding hegemonic stability theory, and examine some of the commonalities
and differences exhibited by in the perspectives of scholars who have written about
the theory.
Chapter Three discusses U.S. policy in the post World War II period in
terms of its orientation toward the establishment and maintenance of an open
international economic order.

Hegemonic stability theory is also discussed in

terms of its application in making predictions as to whether or not there will
continue to be an open international economic order w ith there being no
hegemonic power.
Chapter Four presents a statistical test of the theory of hegemonic stability.
In Chapter Five, the results of the statistical test is be discussed.
results are

Finally, these

used to present a brief prognosis as to the possible changes in the

international economic order over the coming several decades.
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Chapter One

The Theory of Hegemonic Stability

In recent years a number of scholars have advocated a theoretical perspective
regarding international trade policy that appears to offer fresh insights.

This

perspective attempts to explain changes in the openness or restrictedness of
international trade, and thus of the relative level

of international trade, in terms

of the distribution of state power among the core states. In particular, the concern
is with the degree of control one particular state is able to exercise over the
trading policy of the other core states.

This perspective has come to be known

as the "theory of hegemonic stability."
The theory of hegemonic stability holds that a world order dominated by
a single country will be most stable and will have the most open economic
order.1

It is further held that greater aggregate wealth will be produced under

such a world order.

This view is summed up well by Peter Katzenstein, who

maintains that "Periods of imperial ascendance are distinguished by the politics
of plenty,"

while 'Periods of hegemonic decline, on the other hand, are marked

1 Stability, in the context utilized by a number of advocates of
hegemonic stability theory, such as Charles Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin,
refers to an international system with free trade, high levels of foreign
investment, and a w ell-functioning international monetary system. The
system will be called stable only if disagreements between core states
regarding international economic policy are relatively few in number and
do not result in the establishment of major impediments to free trade or
impediments to regularized exchange of currencies.
Such a system is
generally termed a "liberal economic order." Obviously, the term stability
is used in a heavily normative context here.

by the ’politics of scarcity’" (Katzenstein 1977: 9).

Charles Kindleberger refers

to this as "a system of world economy based on leadership (Kindleberger
1981:251).

According to Kindleberger, a liberal economic order
needs

leadership,

a

country

which

is

prepared,

consciously or unconsciously, under some system of
rules it has internationalized, to set standards of
conduct for other countries; and to seek to get others
to follow them... (Kindleberger 1973: 28).
Similarly, Robert Gilpin maintains that a liberal international economy can
only be formed and maintained through the support of the most powerful state
or states in the system (Gilpin 1975:85).

By the term "liberal economic order,"

both Kindleberger and Gilpin are referring to an international economy with an
open market and with readily available currency conversion. In Gilpin’s view, the
efforts of a country in a position of hegemony are required in order to provide
for "a secure status quo free trade, foreign investment, and a well-functioning
international monetary system" (Gilpin 1981: 145).

Kindleberger refers to this

as the provision of public, or cosmopolitan, goods (Kindleberger 1981: 247).

A

public good is one the consumption of which by one unit does not reduce the
amount available for other units (Kindleberger 1981: 243).

Whether or not a

hegemonic state is required in order to provide these "public goods," it is clear that
these factors are positively related to trade among core countries.
is most concerned with the maintenance of "free trade."

Kindleberger

Indeed, the maintenance

of free trade is held to be the major result of hegemonic stability.
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Despite the substantial attention given to the concept of hegemony, there
is no single agreed upon definition of the term.

One problem is that the term

hegemony has been used in a number of different manners; in some cases these
have little relationship to one another.

For example, the term is sometimes used

to describe direct control of one unit over another, with the control being
exercised through political or military means.

One such case is the manner in

which Chinese diplomats have referred to "Soviet hegemony."

Within the context

of hegemonic stability theory, hegemony is basically an economic concept, although,
as I briefly discuss below, it cannot be considered in complete isolation from
non-econom ic factors. Unfortunately, even within the context of economic theory
in general, and hegemonic stability theory in particular, there is not a standardized
definition.

Timothy J. M ckeown notes that while it may not be necessary to

establish a precise share of world capabilities as a threshold that a state must reach
in order to be considered as being hegemonic, it is at least necessary to be able
to determine what relative distributions of capability are required (McKeown 1983:
76).

Unfortunately,

determinations.

McKeown

himself

does

not

make

such

explicit

Indeed, definitions of hegemonic stability have tended in general

to be rather vague.

For example, Robert Keohane defines it as follows:

The theory of hegemonic stability, as applied to the
world

political

preponderance

economy,
of

material

defines

hegemony

resources

as

(Keohane

1984:32).
This definition is not only of little use operationally, but does not even serve
adequately for Keohane’s ow n descriptive purposes, as his discussion of hegemony

centers around the formation and maintenance of regimes by the hegemon, not
merely control over resources.

Immanuel Wallerstein defines hegemony in

economic terms as:
a situation wherein the products of a given core state
are produced so efficiently that they are by and large
competitive even in other core states, and therefore the
given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a
maximally free world market (Wallerstein 1980: 38).
This definition is more specific and subject to examination than that of Keohane,
although again no specific limits are set as to just what conditions must be met
in order for a system to be a hegemonically controlled system.
In terms of military capabilities, the minimum requirements in order for
there to be a hegemonic order is also in question, although here there is a greater
level of agreement than that regarding economic factors (see section on military
power below).

In practice, there is no disagreement about when the major

periods of hegemonic control have occurred.
ends, however, is much less clear.

Precisely when hegemonic control

For purposes of analysis, it is best to view

hegemonic control on a continuum, rather than attempting to define arbitrary limits
for hegemonic control.

The w ould-be hegemon’s level of preponderance of trade

and economic size are the major factors upon which this continuum should be
based.
Hegemony, in the context of hegemonic stability theory, is primarily an
economic term that should not be confused with the many non-specific uses of
the term, based upon a more general concept of power, that are in common use.

Nonetheless, the strong relationship between military and economic power is too
important to be ignored.

Military power and economic power certainly are not

synonymous with one another, but each is dependent upon the other.

In order

to forge and maintain a hegemonic order, a hegemon must posses certain requisite
military capabilities.

For example, it must be able to prevent other states from

using military power to limit access to its key markets.

A t the same time, of

course, military power depends, in part, upon economic power.

Military power

cannot be maintained without a sound economic basis. While military power will
not be directly included the statistical analysis, it must be recognized that the
economic hegemony that is the focus of the present w ork would not be possible
without related military power.

Free Trade and Reciprocity

"Free trade” is the cornerstone of liberal trading policy.

Classical economic

theory holds that free trade is the m ost efficient basis upon which to allocate
resources.

Free trade may be said to exist when three basic conditions are met.

First, there must be no tariff mechanisms, as these may make imported goods
noncompetitive with domestically produced goods.

Second, there must be no

product subsidies, due to the advantages these confer upon the producers of the
subsidized goods.

Third, import quotas must also not exist. When these

conditions are met, the market is said to be "unrestricted" or "open".

The "ideal

type" of free trade would be a situation in which all of these conditions are met
completely.

In practice, of course, these conditions are never completely present;

instead the question is just how close to completely these conditions are met.
Other factors that may cause some reductions in trade, such as production and
licensing agreements, are not considered to be part of the restrictedness of a
market, as these are not structural barriers to the importation of other goods.
Another central component of a liberal trade policy is the principal of
reciprocity.

In some instances, reciprocity may be based upon accords providing

strict guidelines that are designed to insure that the principle of reciprocity is
followed.

Even in lieu of explicit agreements, reciprocity is implicitly required in

order for free trade to be maintained.

Reciprocity in this context may be defined

as "actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others and that cease
when these expected reactions are not forthcoming" (Blau 1964: 6).

If one state

allows goods to be imported from another state without subjecting them to a
tariff, but does not receive reciprocal treatment, it will tend to change its policy
(through reciprocating), with the
Although some form

establishment of a tariff.

of equivalency is a part of most conventional

understandings of reciprocity, absolute equivalence is not a part of all reciprocal
relationships.

Indeed, reciprocity can be present in a relationship among unequals,

where exchanges are not based upon full equivalence (Keohane 1986: 6).
understanding of reciprocity

is different from that in much

This

of the political

literature, where reciprocity often has meant absolute equivalence. Nonetheless, this
has not been the case in much of the sociological literature, such as in the Blau
definition cited above.

In this context, reciprocity means that there is equivalence

of form, but not necessarily of benefits.

For example, there may be a reciprocal

trade agreement between a highly developed and a lesser developed state.

In such

9
a case the rules regulating exchange may be the same for each party, but benefits
may not be at all equally distributed.

This will be discussed more fully below.

Differential Effects of Open Trading Systems

Kindleberger, and, indeed, liberal economists in general, maintain that free
trade is beneficial to all states, and that a hegemon is necessary in order to
maintain such free trade.
public good.
all states.

The provision of free trade is thus seen as being a

In other words, it is a good that may be shared, to advantage, by
Kindleberger states that although both small and large states benefit

from "leadership" (his term for the efforts exerted by a hegemon to maintain a
liberal economic order), the benefits are often even greater for small states than
for large ones.

This is due to the fact that smaller states are more often able to

adopt the role of a "free rider." An example of a free rider in this context would
be a small country that is militarily protected by a large one, and as a result does
not need to maintain a defense force of its own.

In a similar vein, Kindleberger

argues that where a hegemon exercises leadership, the costs for maintaining the
system

(i.e. the maintenance of a steady flow of capital, a stable currency

exchange, etc.) are disproportionately paid by the hegemon, and to a lesser degree
by other relatively large members of the system (Kindleberger 1976:19, 32). This
is in accord with the economic theory of public goods, which hypothesizes that
public goods are under produced due to free riding (Kindleberger 1976: 19).
Kindleberger also assumes that states of all levels of economic development benefit
from "leadership" (Kindleberger 1976:19).

Kindleberger thus maintains that the

10
hegemon performs duties that make it a sort of benevolent benefactor for the
system, whereas he clearly indicates that many other states, particularly smaller
states, benefit from the system without performing sufficient tasks related to the
maintenance of the system.
Kindleberger’s assertion that small
hegemonic stability, particularly with regard
be correct in strictly economic terms.

states tend

to benefit most

from

to the maintenance of freetrade, may

International trade generally accounts for

a larger portion of the aggregate economic activity of these states than is the case
for larger states, due to the smaller internal markets of the smaller states.
Nonetheless, the situation for less developed states is quite different.
Kindleberger’s assumption that free trade will be beneficial even for less
developed states is derived directly from classical economic theory.

Classical

economic theory holds that free trade is essential in order to maintain proper
competition.
conclusion.

The law of comparative advantage establishes the basis for this
According to the law of comparative advantage, the profitability of

trade lies in the fact that certain states or individuals can always produce given
goods or services more efficiently than others.
... such situations may arise
and exchange rates that

This perspective holds that

when there are money

disguise the

real goods

exchange, and when governments interfere with the
market determination of the exchange rate.

But the

principal remains valid that there always must be
some activity in which a country has a comparative
advantage (Grubel 1981:

15).

It is maintained on this basis that free trade is the most beneficial basis of
exchange for states of all levels of development, and thus, that an open trading
system is beneficial to

all states.

Certainly this view

is held by most

contemporary economists in the United States, and there has been remarkably
little scholarly criticism of this position in the U.S.
in U.S. governmental circles.
above statement.
regard.

This is even more the case

Nonetheless, there are numerous problems with the

The following two points are particularly important in this

First, more developed states will always have a comparative advantage

v is -a -v is a much wider range of goods and services than is the case for less
developed states.

Second, there are always some government interventions in the

market that place restrictions upon trade; at some points in time there simply are
less than others.

Less developed states tend to be more greatly disadvantaged

through such interventions than more developed states, since they have less
economic or political power to bring to bear in order to secure their interests.
There is a growing body of literature, much of it coming from outside the
U.S., that provides considerable evidence to support the contention that the degree
to which a state benefits from the existence of free trade is, in fact, strongly
affected by the level of development of the state (Prebisch 1980).
with in great detail especially in

This is dealt

dependency theory and world system’s theory

literature (Emmanuel 1972; Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1979).

While there is

general agreement among both liberal economists and dependency and world
systems theorists that free trade will be maintained only with the existence of a
hegemon, the motives and results assumed by dependency theorists and world
systems theorists are quite different from those assumed by liberal economists.
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For the former, concern centers upon the problem of unequal exchange (Amin
1976; Emmanuel 1972).

According to this perspective, much trade between

developed and less developed countries is detrimental to less developed countries,
due to the considerably higher amounts of labor that generally are required to
produced goods sold from less developed to the developed countries, than vice
versa, for goods priced at the same level.

This type of trade thus is unequal, and

results in a continual loss of value for the less developed countries.
It is extremely difficult for less developed countries foster new industries
'w hen operating in direct competition with industries from more developed
countries.

When a less developed country is penetrated by goods from more

highly developed countries, domestically produced products are generally greatly
disadvantaged unless the costs of the foreign goods are driven up substantially
through the use of tariffs, or domestic goods are subsidized (the latter is generally
a less feasible policy for LDCs, as sufficient capital for such subsidies is generally
not available).

This is due to the lower costs of production in the developed

countries made possible through more efficient means of production and greater
economies of scale.
Not surprisingly given its competitive advantages, a state that has a very
strong market advantage is most likely to want to secure free trade.

For

example, in the first half of the nineteenth century, Great Britain was able to
produce many goods at a substantially lower cost than other states due to the
technological advantages conferred by its early industrialization.

The amount of

labor time required for the manufacture of these goods was much lower than
elsewhere, and British goods could readily be priced at levels far below that of
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the competition.

This gave Great Britain a huge advantage over competitors

without the protection of tariffs or product subsidies.

As British exports

penetrated more and m ore markets with its goods, additional advantages were
gained through more favorable economies of scale.

Therefore, the maintenance of

free trade in the international system was extremely important to British interests.
It is important to note that the U.S. itself industrialized behind a system
of heavy tariff barriers in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Without

protection against British industrial goods, this development would have at least
been greatly impeded, and probably made impossible.

Indeed, the debate over

free trade was a principal cause of the American Civil War.

Southern planter

interests wanted to continue to purchase cheap British goods, whereas northern
industrial interests realized that they could develop only with protection against
such goods. The British advantages in terms of both economies of scale and
technology were simply too large to be overcome without such protection.

The Movement from Free Trade to Restriction

The example of Britain in the latter half of the nineteenth century provides
an excellent example of a hegemon’s position with regard to market openness.
From the end of the Napoleonic wars until the period of 1870-1880, Britain was
clearly the preeminent economic power in the world. In 1870, Britain accounted
for 24 percent of world trade (Lake 1983: 525).

Also, Britain accounted for

31.8% of the w orld’s production of manufactured goods; in this category they
remained even above the U.S. (although by the period of 1881-1885, the U.S.
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had surpassed Britain in this category; the percentages were 28.6 and 26.6
respectively).

Britain’s nearest European competitor in manufactured goods,

Germany, accounted for only 13.2% of the w orld’s manufactured goods.

The

second major competitor, France, accounted for 10.3% (League of Nations 1945:
13).

By 1880 Britain still had the highest per capita income in the world, and

accounted for approximately double the share of world trade and investment of
France, its closest competitor in trade and investment.

The only major areas in

which Britain had been surpassed were in aggregate economic size; the U.S.
economy was by this time the largest in the world, and in the level of
manufactures.

Nonetheless, the U.S. was not yet a major player in matters of

international economics, and was generally not integrated into the international
political economy.

U.S. trade and investment remained extremely low, relative to

that of France and Germany, much less Britain.

For this reason, Britain remained

virtually unchallenged as the world’s major economic force.
When the power of a hegemon begins declining precipitously relative to
that of other core powers, there is a strong tendency for it to move away from
a free trade posture.

Although Britain remained the preeminent economic power

in terms of w orld trade and investment after 1870, it was rapidly loosing ground
to the U.S. and Germany, among others.

British colonies began to erect trade

barriers to which only British goods were exempted, particularly in the 1890s.
Additionally, Britain began to re-introduce major tariffs on imported goods,
although this did not occur until 1915.

It should be noted in this context that

a hegemon’s retreat from a free trade posture is generally a long, gradual process.
As we may see, although British power was declining relative to that of other
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major states after 1870, the retreat from a free trade posture w ar certainly not
immediate. There is considerable inertia present in the system. Nonetheless, from
the 1870s on, Britain no longer worked to maintain an open economic order.
Eventually, Britain itself enacted tariff legislation.
W ith the end of the Second World War, the U.S. quickly became established
as the new hegemon.

The major industrial powers of Europe,

Great Britain,

France, and Germany, were in a shambles both in terms of their physical plants
and in terms of economic organization in general.

The U.S. emerged from the

war far stronger than the other major actors, both economically and militarily.
U.S. policymakers quickly worked to reorder the international economic system
in a manner believed to be conducive to U.S. interests.

In particular, the U.S.

sought to establish a new economic order based upon a system of free trade
similar to that forged by the U.K. in the nineteenth century.

The U.S. was the

principal architect of a number of international institutions and agreements designed
to facilitate this economic order, including the Bretton Woods monetary accord,
and the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These institutions will
be discussed more fully in Chapter Four.
As was the case w ith Britain of the 1870s, however, the U.S. is now no
longer at the apex of its power, and continues to decline in terms of its share
of world trade and investment
F our).

(for a more complete discussion, see Chapter

It m ust be emphasized that we are referring here to relative, rather than

to an absolute decline in U.S. power. As a result, a number of tariffs against
specific goods have been put in place, and there is a strong movement toward the
erection of further tariff barriers.

Whereas in the early decades after World War

16
II the U.S. had sought to convince the nations of the world that free trade was
in everyone’s best interest, the U.S. is now beginning to retreat somewhat from
this stance.

Thus it is clear that free trade is an important part of the ideology

of those with the most advantaged position, and that this ideology begins to
change as advantage is eroded.
There is an interesting paradox regarding hegemonic decline that seems, at
first glance, to run counter to the theory of hegemonic stability.

There is a

tendency for a declining hegemon to enter into a series of reciprocal trade
relationships. For example, beginning in the 1870s, Great Britain gradually entered
into such trade relationships, particularly with its own colonies.
that this would
opposite.

serve to increase trade.

It might seem

However, the actual effectis quite the

Movement from open trade relations to trade relations based upon

reciprocal trade agreements tends to reduce,rather than to increase the aggregate
\

level of trade in the system.

This is due to the fact that reciprocal trade

agreements confer specific advantages upon the parties to the agreement, thus
creating competitive disadvantages for other parties.
reciprocate by also entering into reciprocal arrangements.

Other states

tend to

Therefore, competition

is reduced, and the aggregate level of trade tends to decline.

Thus, the fact that

declining hegemons enter into such reciprocal relations serves as a support to the
theory of hegemonic stability.
The impetus for the establishment of protectionist policies for a declining
hegemon may, of course, come initially from government circles or may emanate
from various pressure groups or the most basic constituency level.

Regardless of

the national source of such an impetus, it is the contention of hegemonic stability
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theoiy that this impetus is the result of the hegemonic decline itself.

As the

hegemon becomes less able to dominate trade, jobs tend to be lost and wage
levels tend to decline, or at least to decline in their rate of growth.

Therefore,

pressure to institute protectionist policies is likely to come from a variety of
sources.

The important point for the present analysis is the contention that such

pressure comes as a result of the hegemon’s decline.

Military Power

The question as to the means a hegemon uses in order to foster an open
international trading system is of central importance to hegemonic stability theory.
Particularly, it is necessary to consider the question as to whether economic or
military initiatives are best suited for such purposes.

Stephen Krasner states that

where there are dramatic asymmetries between the capabilities of the hegemon and
weaker states, the hegemon may use military power to coerce the weaker states
to adopt an open trading structure.

However, he emphasizes that force is not a

very efficient means of changing economic policies, and that it is particularly
unlikely that force will be utilized to change the policies of m edium -sized states
(Krasner 1976: 322).

Robert Keohane also notes that it is difficult in the

contemporaiy world for' a hegemon to use military power directly to attain its
economic policy objectives with its military partners and allies (Keohane 1984:
40).
Instead, Krasner argues that the hegemonic state may best use its economic
resources in order to create an open trading structure.

This may take the form
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of positive incentives, such as offering access to its domestic market and its
relatively cheap exports, or of negative sanctions, such as the withholding of aid
or engagement in competition in third country markets that may ruin the second
country’s chance for exports (Krasner 1976: 3 2 2 -3 2 3 ).
Robert Keohane notes that a hegemonic state must "be able to protect the
international political economy that it dominates from incursions by hostile
adversaries" (Keohane 1984: 39).

Nonetheless, he further notes that a state need

not be dominant militarily w orld-w ide in order to be hegemonic.

Neither British

power in the nineteenth century, or American power in the decades following
World War II, ever reached such a level. Throughout the nineteenth century Great
Britain was challenged by the continental European powers, and even at the apex
of American power following World War II, the Soviet Union presented a
challenge to American dominance.

Nonetheless, Britain was able to dominate the

international political economy through most of the nineteenth century, and the
U.S. was able to do so between late 1945 and the early 1970s.
The military conditions for economic hegemony are
met if the economically preponderant country has
sufficient military capabilities to prevent incursions by
others that would deny it access to major areas of its
economic activity

(Keohane 1984: 40 ).

If these military conditions are not met, hegemony may be ended rather quickly.
Immanuel Wallerstein points out that Dutch economic hegemony in the seventeenth
century was destroyed through the use of military force by Great Britain and
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France (Wallerstein 1980: 3 8 -3 9 ).

Lack of sufficient military power to protect

its markets thus led to the end of Dutch hegemony.

Differences in the level of International Trade between Small and Large Industrial
States

In general, international trade accounts for a greater portion of the economic
activity of small states than of large ones (Krasner 1976: 319).

Small states in

this context refers to states with relatively small populations; particularly where
the population is below ten million.

Notable among small highly industrialized

states, for example, are Denmark and Finland.

The reasons that trade accounts

for a particularly large portion of economic activity of small states are quite clear.
Small states generally have to import more goods per capita than larger states due
to the fact that small states are less able to manufacture all of the specific goods
that are desired.

Additionally, exports are particularly important to smaller states

because their internal markets are not sufficiently large to provide favorable
economies of scale.
quantities.

M any goods cannot be produced efficiently in small

Therefore, while exports are important for all states in terms of

economies of scale, this is particularly so for smaller states.

Largely because of

these factors, at any given time there will be wide variations among states in
terms of their ratios of trade to national income2, even among states of relatively
equal levels of development.

■y

Specific trade policies of the different countries do,

National Income is often used by various authors as synonymous
with Gross National Product. Gross National Product is used as the measure
of National Income in this analysis.
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of course, have some affect here.

It is the change in this ratio for each individual

state over time with which we are concerned.

If the theory of hegemonic stability

is correct, there should be a general decline in the proportion of trade to national
income as the market becomes more restricted due to the failure of the hegemon
to maintain an open market.
Obviously, at any given time certain states will have particular policies
designed either to increase or decrease their level of international trade.

For

example, a given state may wish to decrease its level of imports in either a
selective or general manner.

A selective approach would be utilized to protect

the development or continuance of specific industries.

A general reduction in

the level of imports may be desired in order to ameliorate an unfavorable balance
of trade.

Certainly the trade policies of smaller states are often based upon

considerations different from those of larger states, given their extreme market
vulnerability due to their particularly high levels of trade.

Nonetheless, structural

factors constrain the manner in which a state may act to change its balance of
trade.

In some cases, the simple fear that the imposition of tariffs may cause

other states to reciprocate will be sufficient to deter the implementation of such
a policy.

In a system dominated by a hegemon, the hegemon may bring various

pressures to bear in order to insure that other states maintain a free trade posture.
In some instances, this may even take the form of direct military intervention.
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International Political Economy

It should be clear from the discussion of hegemonic stability theory in this
chapter that this w ork falls clearly within the realm of international political
economy.

While there clearly is a strong economic component, there is a strong

political component as well.

Indeed, hegemonic stability theory cannot be

considered in a strictly economic context.
Much of the pressure that a hegemon brings to bear on other states in
order to secure a liberal international economic order is brought within a political
context.

Even threats of economic sanctions, while certainly within the realm of

economics, also have a strong political component.
viable without other supporting factors.
not able to use

economic sanctions

Economic threats cannot be

For example, a militarily weak state is
within the same latitude of circumstances

as is a militarily strong state.Additionally, the

particular groups of allies that

a state has may be a key determinant of whether or not that state is in a
position to use economic sanctions in specific situations.
Finally, it should be noted that the aggregate nature of the
economy has major ramifications for international politics.
clearly is today less able to
political economy is regulated

world political

For example, the U.S.

dictate the terms under which

the international

than in the period in which the U.S. had greater

economic power relative to other major industrialized states.

The form of

international economic organization (such as the degree to which the system is
"open" or "restricted") is thus determined by both economic and political factors.
We could not speak of the existence of a hegemon on the basis of economic
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factors alone.

In turn, the form of international economic organization has

significant ramifications for international politics in general. Certainly, for example,
the question of military balances and struggles in the Middle East cannot be
discussed without reference to both regional and global economic factors v is - a vis oil.

In Chapter Four, some of the specific ramifications of the changing world

political economy for international politics in general will be discussed.
In the next chapter, some of the major w ork that has been done by a
number of scholars regarding hegemonic stability theory will be discussed.

In

particular, the question of the manner in which different versions of the theory
are similar, and the manner in which they diverge will be examined.

r

Chapter 2

In this chapter major literature
examined.
discussed.

First, what has come to

related to hegemonic stability

will be

be know n as "regime analysis" will be

This represents a modification to hegemonic stability theory that some

scholars maintain is necessary in order for the theory to work.

"Cycle theory" is

also discussed, as the cycle theory literature strongly overlaps with the hegemonic
stability theory literature.

Some of the similarities and differences in the work

of various scholars doing w ork regarding hegemonic stability are also examined.
Finally, we will examine an article that attempts to test hegemonic stability theory
by utilizing a group of case studies; perhaps the only major test of this form to
date.

Regime Analysis

Some theorists have criticized the theory of hegemonic stability, at
the form in which it is generally presented.

Robert Keohane argues that in its

crudest form, the theory has little analytical value.
fails

to

explain

He

asserts that the theory

lags between changes in power

structures and changes in international regimes; does
not account well for the differential durability of
different institutions within a given issue-area and
avoids addressing the question of why international
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least in
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regimes seem so much more extensive now in world
politics than during earlier periods (such as the late
19th Century)

of supposed hegemonic leadership

(Keohane 1982: 326).
He proposes that the primary problems of the theory can be greatly mitigated
by focusing upon the relationship between the concentration of power in the
international system and the supply of international regimes.1
We will use Keohane’s definition of regimes as
those arrangements for issue areas that embody implicit
rules

and norms

insofar as

they

actually guide

behavior of important actors in a particular issue area
(Keohane 1980: 133).
Keohane advocates the use of "a structural approach to international regime change,
differentiated by issue area" (Keohane 1980: 154).

Three such issue areas cited

by Keohane are the international petroleum regime, the international monetary
regime, and the international trade regime.2

It is his contention that eroding

U.S.hegemony is helpful in accounting for changes in the international petroleum
regime, less so for the international monetary regime, and even less to the
international trade regimes (it should be noted that he provides little empirical
evidence to justify this contention).

1 The phrase "supply of international regimes" comes from Keohane,
and is used here to help illustrate his view of the context within which
international regimes are formed.
In this dissertation, the more general version of the theory of
hegemonic stability is the theory being addressed, except when it is noted
otherwise.
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In this work, the concentration is directly upon matters of international
trade; thus the primary concern is with issues that Keohane would include as
components of the international trade regime

Indeed, it is international trade

that is the central focus of hegemonic stability theory as espoused by Kindleberger
and most other theorists.

Nonetheless, it is m y contention that issue areas should

not be differentiated within the context of hegemonic stability theory in the
manner suggested by Kindleberger.

I will also argue that Keohane’s conclusions

are based, at least in part, upon erroneous reasoning.
While differentiation by issue areas certainly has face validity and may be
of some analytical utility,

whether the issue areas may be separated as clearly as

Keohane suggests is questionable at best.

It is clear, for example, that the

international trade regime has strong structural links with the international
monetary regime.

For example, international trade is highly affected by changes

in international monetary policy.

Thus, these issue areas do not form mutually

exclusive categories.
Second, some of the explanations Keohane offers for changes in the different
regimes seem questionable.

For example, in his explanation of changes in the

international trade regime, he notes,
Most explanations of increased protectionism also focus
on the recession of the

1970s and the rise of

manufactured exports from less developed countries,
(a position which Keohane supports) (Keohane 1980:
153).
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While this argument is undoubtedly largely correct, it misses the key point.

The

seriousness of the recession itself, although a part of the general boom and bust
cycle, was more than likely deepened by the lack of monetary control due to the
breakup of the Bretton Woods international monetary regime; a matter which
Keohane himself discusses at length, but does not relate to the seriousness of
recession.

Perhaps even more importantly, the rise of manufactured exports from

less developed countries relative to those from the hegemonic (or previously
hegemonic) power is itself a manifestation of the erosion of hegemony. Therefore,
this certainly cannot properly be used as an argument against hegemonic stability
theory in the manner suggested by Keohane.

Again, the structural links between

the regimes analyzed by Keohane are much more important than he suggests.
Despite some of the problems suggested above, regime analysis has become
increasingly common in the international relations literature in recent years.
Although the acceptance of regime analysis has not been unequivocal, criticism has
been relatively limited.

Nonetheless, a few scholars have suggested that the utility

of this form of analysis may be less than is generally accepted.

Indeed, Susan

Strange argues that not only is this the case, but further asks
whether it may not even be actually negative in its
influence,

obfuscating

and

confusing

instead

of

clarifying and illuminating, and distorting by concealing
bias instead of revealing and removing it

(Strange

1982: 479).
While Strange advances a number of excellent arguments against the use of
regime analysis, her argument regarding bias is particularly noteworthy.

The
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primary bias lies in the fact that there is a general assumption that everyone
wants more and better regimes (Strange 1982: 478).

It is interesting to note

in this context that in the same issue of International Organization in which
Strange’s article here cited appeared (an issue focusing on regime analysis), one
of the articles is even titled "The Demand for International Regimes" (by Robert
Keohane).

The assumption that regimes are desired by all (or, at least most)

is quite common.

Strange further points out this bias by quoting from the earliest

draft of editor Stephen Krasner’s introductory article to the above cited volume
of International Organization:"... .the most fundamental concern of social theory: how
is order established,maintained and destroyed?" (Krasner 1979).

Not included as

primary concerns of social theory here are questions such as those relating to
justice or other normative considerations.

Although Strange does not delve more

fully into the factors influencing the direction of social theory, it is clear how
strongly structural functionalism has influenced much of the literature.
It is entirely possible that most states do, in fact, desire there to be
international regimes, but this certainly does not mean that most desire the types
of regimes that have been established since the end of World War II (an
assumption generally made in the American literature).

Many of the regimes

that are in place have been highly detrimental to many less-developed countries.
That many do not desire the same types of regimes as those favored by the U.S.
and to some extent other Western powers is clear (a simple examination of U.N.
General Assembly votes is telling in this regard).
Further, a number of states have gone beyond the point of simply rejecting
the extant regimes, and have proposed the formation of new regimes, or, at least
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major alterations in existing ones.

An excellent example of proposed regime

creation and alteration is the proposal by a large portion of the w orld’s developing
states for the development of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO).
This includes, for example, a call for a major redistribution of international credit
(the formation of a new credit regime).

It also includes a call for the developing

states to have a much larger voice in structures existing under present regimes,
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Krasner notes that the distribution of votes and power in international
organizations is often not congruent with the distribution of state power (Krasner
1985: 75 ).

He further notes that "During periods of hegemonic decline there is

a propensity to move from congruence to incongruence or even to dynamic
instability" (Krasner 1985: 75).

As he points out, one of the ironies is that

hegemonic powers tend to create international regimes that include international
organizations that initially serve their interests, but that later may be restructured
by other actors for other purposes.
Court of Justice.

A good example of this is the International

Thus far, this type of restructuring has not taken place with

any of the major international monetary institutions,such as the Word Bank or the
International Monetary Fund.

This is due to the disproportionate number of votes

of the United States (and, to a lesser degree, of other major economic powers
such as West Germany, France, and Great Britain).
It should be noted that a determination that regime analysis of the type
suggested by Keohane is not tenable does not mean that we should not discuss
specific regimes.

Indeed, one can certainly refer to specific regimes, such as the

international monetary regime, for analytical purposes.

However, reference to a
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regime in this manner does not imply that regimes may be studied separately in
the manner of Keohane’s work.

In this dissertation, when the term regime is

used, it refers to a particular set of implicitly understood rules for a given issue
area (in the manner of Keohane’s own initial definition), but does not imply the
type of relative issue autonomy of the type that is inherent in Keohane’s work.3

Cycle Theory
Cycle Theory is a theory of international political economy that contains
hegemonic stability as a central component.

Indeed, in cycle theory the central

manner in which the w orld system is characterized is in terms of the degree to
which it is a system dominated by a hegemon or the degree to which there is
core competition.

A number of analysts, particularly world systems theorists

such as Wallerstein, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Richard Rubinson, among
others, maintain that the system alternates between periods of hegemony and
periods of core competition on a more or less regular basis (Chase-D unn and
Rubinson 1977: 463).

It is their contention that this alternation has taken place

since the sixteenth century, the beginning of what Wallerstein terms the modem
world system.
The alternation between hegemony and core competition is generally divided
into two primary phases. The A -phase is the period in which one particular state

3 As a byproduct of the statistical test of hegemonic stability theory
presented in Chapter Four, the theory is, in fact, tested with regard to
Keohane’s concept of looking at the international trade regime separately.
One of the three basic equations that is utilized is concerned solely with
factors involving international trade, and may be used as a test of
Keohane’s version of the theory pertaining to an international trade regime.
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is greatly increasing its economic power relative to that of other core states.

The

A -phase lasts until the time when the hegemon has reached the pinnacle of its
power.

After this time follows a period in which the economic power of the

hegemon declines relative to that of other core states. The hegemon may, in fact,
still be growing economically in absolute terms, but nonetheless be losing ground
in relative terms due to more rapid growth of other core states.
decline is termed the B-phase.

The period of

Taken together, the A -phase and B-phase

constitute a systemic cycle which begins with a period of core competition, enters
a phase in which the system is dominated by a hegemon, and then returns to a
period of core competition. Another cycle then follows.
A number of scholars have argued that these cycles occur in a regularized
time frame.

For example, this may take the form of long waves of roughly

determinant length, such as the Kondratieff wave, a hypothetical business cycle
wave lasting approximately forty years (Kondratieff 1979).

Nonetheless, while

there is substantial evidence to support the existence of general cycles (at least
over the past several hundred years), the evidence indicates that the periods of
time required for the cycle to run its course varies from case to case (Bergesen
1981: 1 8 7 -1 8 8 ).
George Modelski, like Wallerstein, places the beginning of the modem world
system around 1500 (Modelski 1978: 214).

He asserts that since this time, the

world system may be seen as having gone through a series of cycles with an
average period of just over one hundred years (Modelski 1978: 217).

Modelski

states that each cycle begins with a period of weak system organization that
ultimately dissolves into a global war.

The result of such a global war is the
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emergence of one world power that is preponderant and thus able to dominate
the system, and maintain systemic order.

Ultimately, the dominant power looses

ground relative to competitors, and eventually the system again disintegrates,
resulting in global war (Modelski 1978: 217).
Modelski states that there have been five such cycles since the beginning
of the modem world system:

the period of domination by Portugal from 1494

through 1576-1580; domination by The Netherlands (United Provinces) from
1609 through 1672-1678; a first period of British domination from 1713 through
the late 1700s; a second period of British domination from 1815 through 1939;
and a period of U.S. domination beginning in 1945 that has not yet ended.

It

must be noted that there is rather general, although not complete agreement among
scholars as to these cited periods.

There is no major dispute in the literature

regarding the periods of domination or hegemony by The Netherlands, the second
British period, or the U.S.period.

However, Modelski himself notes that some

scholars hold that the major power of the sixteenth century was Spain rather than
Portugal (Modelski 1978: 219).

Secondly, not all major scholars concerned with

cycles and hegemonic stability identify the period that Modelski refers to as the
first British period.

Finally,as we have already seen, most scholars place the end

of what Modelski refers to as the second British period much earlier than 1939.
For Modelski, 1939 has to be considered as the end of the period due to the fact
that,in his theoretical perspective, each period of domination must end with global
war.

In this context, Modelski holds that World Wars I and II were both part

of the same basic global conflict that ended one world order, and began anew one
in 1945.
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It should be noted that Modelski’s w ork is generally referred to as cycle
theory rather than hegemonic stability theory.

Another self-proclaimed "cycle

theorist" Suzanne Frederick maintains that "a long-cycle perspective of world
leadership leads to a different (but occasionally overlapping) interpretation of
systemic power hierarchy" (Frederick 1987: 192).

It is her contention that

hegemonic leadership "is conceived of as predominantly economic in nature,"
whereas "the long cycle perspective proposes that minimum threshold levels of
systemic political-military capability concentration have been required..." (Frederick
1987: 193).

While it is certainly true that hegemonic stability theory is basically

economic in nature, it is definitely not the case that hegemonic stability theory
does not hold that minimum militaiy thresholds are required. While it is true that
some "cycle theorists," including Modelski, may deal somewhat more with military
power than do hegemonic stability theorists, there is general agreement regarding
basic military thresholds.
Modelski also undertakes a comparison of long cycle theory with hegemonic
stability theory.

He notes that there is indeed "considerable convergence" between

the tw o approaches (Modelski 1987: 12).
there are also significant differences.

Nonetheless, it is his contention, that

For example, he notes that while hegemonic

stability theory posits a direct relationship between hegemony and the existence
of free trade policies, this is not completely the case for the long-cycle
perspective.

In the latter perspective, a relationship between hegemony and free

trade is posited, but the relationship is held to be more variable, depending upon
specific conditions.

This is, in fact, probably the largest difference between the

two perspectives, and it certainly is of significance.

Modelski also contends, as
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did Frederick, that the long-cycle perspective is more concerned with strategic
concerns than is hegemonic stability theory.
Unfortunately, Modelski makes another comparison between hegemonic
stability theory and long-cycle theory that is completely unfounded.

He states

that the long-cycle perspective, in contrast to hegemonic stability theory, is
concerned
not just with leadership, but also with the challenges
to leadership, and with the tension that inevitably
arises between them —

a tension that imparts a

dynamic quality to the entire process (Modelski 1987:
1 2 -1 3 ).
Hegemonic stability theory is, in fact, directly concerned with the challenge to
leadership and the tension thus arising.

Indeed, this challenge is one of the major

factors that is held to result in a loss of hegemony.
As we have seen, to maintain that there are no relevant differences between
hegemonic stability theory and the long-cycle perspective would be incorrect.
Two differences may be clearly discerned:

1. The long-cycle perspective does

concentrate upon military and strategic matter somewhat more than does hegemonic
stability theory.

2. The relationship between hegemony and free trade is less

clear-cut in long-cycle theory than in hegemonic stability theory. The latter point
is particularly important for the present work, as a statistical test of the
relationship between hegemony and free trade appears in Chapter Three. Therefore,
this must be considered as being directly a test of an important axiom of
hegemonic stability theoiy, but not of long-cycle theory.

Nonetheless, the results
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certainly will pertain to long-cycle theory, as the degree to which the relationship
is present or not present is of concern here as well.
In conclusion, while there certainly are differences in the perspectives, the
commonalities are also strong.
of hegemonic orders.

Both are directly concerned with the rise and fall

Both identify, at the very least, specific periods of British

and American hegemony, and both see many common conditions involved in the
transition from hegemony to competition.
Perhaps most important of all, both maintain that the system will only be
stable when one a hegemonic state is present.

To try to force distinctions

between the perspectives that simply do not exist, as Modelski and Frederick
have both done, can only be dysfunctional in the long run.
Until the present, movement from hegemony to core competition, which
may also be termed as movement along the unicentric-multicentric continuum,
has coincided with the expansion and contraction of colonialism (Bergesen and
Schoenberg 1980: 238).

Colonialism has expanded when economic power has

been held by a number of core states,without any one state being clearly
predominant.

Colonialism has contracted when one state has become predominant

in the system; i.e. the hegemon.

The British case of the nineteenth century serves

as an excellent illustration of this point.

Until the latter portion of the nineteenth

century, Britain dominated the system, and established a free trade regime.
Although some colonization did, in fact, take place during this period,the rate was
rather gradual.

As Britain’s power and the British-established free trade regime

eroded, particularly after 1870, a scramble began among the core powers to carve
up the remaining un colonized parts of the world.

Thus, colonial empires were
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expanded rapidly during this period.

Britain itself was a major player in this

expansion, even adding an area as vast as India to its empire.

By the end of the

century, much of Africa and a substantial portion of Asia had been colonized.
With the ascendance of the U.S. as a hegemon in the post-W orld War II
period, and with the advent of a new free trade regime, the gradual process of
decolonization began.

This process has now been almost completed.

The crux of the argument is that when the system is multicentric, it is
inherently unstable, and states utilize colonization as a mechanism for regularizing
their economic relations.

For example, core states trading with their own colonies

are not subject to the uncertainties and differential treatment of changing tariff
policies.

By contrast, when the system is dominated by a hegemon and a free

trade regime is in place, conflict is minimized and economic transactions take place
in a more stable environment.

Linkages in the system between core and

peripheral states are primarily economic, rather than explicitly political, as in the
case of colonialism.
An important question that needs to be addressed is whether systems with
declining hegemons will continue to be reshaped as colonial systems.

Although

the suggestion that this is the case is sometimes made, it seems rather unlikely
given the present world order.

In particular, the present balance between the

Western Powers and the Eastern Bloc would seem to greatly mitigate the
possibility of a return to colonialism (this will be discussed more fully in Chapter
Five).

A much more likely scenario is that as hegemony continues to erode, the

world economy will come to be based more and more upon various particularistic
trade agreements, with free trade thus becoming much less common.

This has
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been the pattern the last several hundred years, although until the present it has
been accompanied by waves of colonization.

If the theory of hegemonic stability

is correct, this will also mean that international trade will gradually decrease for
the core states, as a percentage of aggregate national income.
In

short, while for

unicentricity

to

the last several hundred years movement from

multicentricity

has

been

accompanied

by

movement

from

core-periphery relations based on primarily economic linkages to relations based
increasingly on colonial arrangements, it is quite possible that this will not be
the case in the future.

Instead, as we have discussed above, the changes may

be simply in the form of the economic linkages.

Nonetheless, the cycle of

movement toward and away from colonialism is not generally viewed analytically
as being the same as the movement from unicentricity to multicentricity; it is seen
as a cycle resulting from the latter movement.

Again, it m ust be emphasized that

the argument regarding colonialism is advanced by the w orld systems theorists, not
by such liberal theorists as Kindleberger and Keohane. For the latter, the focus is
entirely upon the unicentricity/multicentricity continuum.

Differences

As is usually the case with regard to general theories, there are some
differences among advocates of hegemonic stability theory as to some of the
theory’s specifics. There is, of course, general agreement that a hegemon is needed
in order to create and maintain an open international order (although Keohane,
departing from the general theory, maintains that once the regimes to support an
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open international regime have been created, a hegemon may no longer be
essential).

Nonetheless, there are some notable differences among theorists,

particularly with regard to the question as to the specific character of the role
played by the hegemon.
As we have already seen, Kindleberger and Keohane both maintain that
the hegemon performs a role that is beneficial to the world order in general.
Kindleberger’s choice of the term "leadership" to describe the role taken by the
hegemon is strongly indicative of this understanding.

Nonetheless, Kindleberger

himself notes that it is not always easy to distinguish leadership from exploitation
(Kindleberger 1981: 248).

Despite this, he maintains that the U.S. has generally

assumed a leadership role rather than one of exploitation.

He does suggest that

from the end of World War II until 1960, "domination was inadvertently involved"
(Kindleberger 1981: 248). Nonetheless, two important points need to be noted
here. First, Kindleberger refers to any denomination present as being "inadvertent,"
although he does not spell out the specific forms of domination and does not
indicate in what manner this domination was inadvertent.

Secondly, although he

admits that exploitation is possible, when discussing the American case he
substitutes the term "domination" for "exploitation."
this

substitution,

exploitation.

domination

clearly has

Although he does not discuss

a less determinant meaning than

Some, but not all, domination includes exploitation.

Finally,

Kindleberger believes that by 1960, domination was not present in the U.S. role
as "leader." (Kindleberger 1981: 248).
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Kindleberger does note that public goods are sometimes competitive with
private goods.

He cites U.S.management of the exchange standard from 1945

to 1971 as such a case.This, he states,
can be viewed as provision of either the public good
of international money, or the private good for itself
of seignorage, which is the profit that comes to the
seigneur, or sovereign power, from the issuance of
money. Of course it can be both (Kindleberger 1981:
248).
Kindleberger argues that whatever surplus is gained by the hegemon in this manner
may be seen as being a benefit gained in return for the disproportionate system
maintenance costs bome by the hegemon (Kindleberger 1981: 248).

His primary

concern lies w ith the instances where the public good is underproduced due to the
abundance of free riders, where "there is neither domination nor self-abnegation
in the interest of responsibility" (Kindleberger 1981: 249).

He believes that "the

system is essentially unstable and subject to entropy" (Kindleberger 1981: 250).
The leadership role may be threatened by the refusal of followers to go along, or
due to the inability or unwillingness of the hegemon to pay the costs of system
maintenance.

In Kindleberger’s view, the latter will be brought about principally

due to an increase of costs resulting from an increase in free riding (Kindleberger
1981: 251).
Keohane is somewhat more direct than Kindleberger in acknowledging that
some advantages do accrue to the hegemon.
the hegemon and an entrepreneur.

He draws a parallel here between

In order for an entrepreneur to make a
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particular set of investments, he must be convinced that he will be able to gain
more from the investments than merely than the value of the investments
themselves.

The promise simply of a social good is not sufficient.

Keohane

argues that a government, in effect acting as an entrepreneur, will have the same
requirements.

For example, a government "must expect to be able to gain more

itself from the regime than it invests in organizing the activity" (Keohane 1982:
339).

Therefore, a hegemon is unlikely to carry out the stabilizing role for the

system if the maintenance costs are greater than the perceived value of received
benefits.
Despite the fact that Keohane is more explicit than Kindleberger in his
discussion regarding benefits for the hegemon, his major concern for the system
is virtually identical to that of Kindleberger.

Keohane states that the big problem

is that a situation is most likely to exist where
no potential entrepreneur is large relative to the whole
set of potential beneficiaries, and where'free riders’
cannot be prevented from benefiting from cooperation
without paying proportionately (Kindleberger 1982:
339).
This is the same as Kindleberger’s concern about the tendency of public goods
to be underproduced relative to private goods due to the problem of free riding.
Robert Gilpin states that
Since the Industrial Revolution, the two successive
hegemonic powers in the global system (Great Britain
and the United States)

have sought to organize
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political, territorial, and especially economic relations
in terms of their respective security and economic
interests (Gilpin 1981: 144).
He further states that the hegemonic power supplies public goods, particularly
security, in exchange for revenue (Gilpin 1981: 1 4 4 -1 4 5 ).

It is thus clear that

for Gilpin the primary motivation for the hegemon to stabilize the political
economy is that this enhances its own economic and security positions.

In this

context he further notes that economic and technical transfers to developing
countries are motivated primarily by political and military considerations rather
than by the specific needs of the recipient countries

(Gilpin

1981:

143).

Nonetheless, Gilpin does not see the structural relationship between the hegemon
and under developed societies as being detrimental to the latter to the same degree
as do dependency theorists and world systems theorists.

This will be discussed

in greater detail below.
Stephen Krasner, like Kindleberger and Keohane, states that at the height
of its power, the hegemonic state will disproportionately supply collective goods
for the system. This supply will decline as the hegemon declines in power, relative
to that of other states. Krasner notes that a declining power is less willing to
sacrifice particular advantages in order to serve international principles and norms
(Krasner 1985: 78). Nonetheless, this does not mean that Krasner sees the role
of the hegemon as a benevolent one.

For example, after stating that the U.S. was

the primary force in creating the international organizations after World War II,
he notes: "For a hegemonic power, the purpose of such organizations is to
legitimate its preferences and values" (Krasner 1985: 10).

Of course, such
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preferences and values need not, in all cases, run counter to the needs and
preferences of other states.

It is clear that most preferences and values will run

counter to those of some states, and in support of those of others.
Krasner makes it completely clear that the international regimes that have
been fostered by the U.S., in their present form, largely run counter to the
interests of most less developed countries.

It should further be noted that in

may cases, the form of these regimes has been supported by most other
industrialized countries, in addition to the U.S.

Therefore, this is a case where

the interests and preferences of the U.S. were generally in accord with those of
other industrialized states, but contrary to those of less developed countries.
Indeed, Krasner states that
Relations between industrialized and developing areas
are found to be conflictual because most Southern
countries cannot hope to cope with their international
vulnerability except by challenging principles, norms,
and rules preferred by industrialized countries (Krasner
1985: 3).
We have already seen that world systems theorists describe a variance in the
world system between periods when the distribution of power among core states
is unicentric, with one hegemonic state, and periods when the distribution is
multicentric. Chase-D unn and Richard Rubinson, and Albert Szymanski, state that
when the system is unicentric, the role played by the hegemon allows other core
states to avoid the overhead costs of maintaining stability in the system
(Chase-D unn and Rubinson 1977: 464; Szymanski 1973: 1 -1 4 ).
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Chase-D unn and Rubinson summarize the world systems theory position
on unicentricity v is -a -v is system stability as follows:
Unicentric

periods

are

characterized by

relatively

peaceful economic competition in a relatively integrated
world

economy

supported

by

the

institutional

framework based on the hegemonic core state in
international agreements (C hase-D unn and Rubinson
1977: 464).
This is virtually identical to the role description of the hegemon, and the concept
of unicentric stability, held by Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen
Krasner.

In fact, on a basic level, the general description of hegemony varies little

between any of the aforementioned scholars, or between these scholars and world
systems theorists.
identical.

Their understandings of the operation of hegemony are nearly

This includes their w ork on the movement of the world system

between unicentric and multicentric periods, the basic factors which cause this
movement to take place, and the way in which the hegemon operates to stabilize
the system.

It is quite striking that this should be so, given the differences in

perspective between these scholars, and particularly between these scholars and
world systems theorists.

The differences of perspective lie not in the descriptions

of the operation of hegemony, but in the specific results of hegemony.
I will here summarize the basic perspectives of the scholars discussed above
regarding hegemonic stability.

As we have seen, Kindleberger and Keohane hold

that more benefits accrue to a system with a hegemon than to a system without
one.

The general position is that all states will tend to benefit from this form
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of system organization, regardless of their level of development.
imply that all are affected in the same manner.

This does not

For example, developed states

are purported to pay more maintenance costs than others.

Also, Keohane states

that the hegemon does derive some benefits as a result of its particular role in
the system. Nonetheless, benefits are said to accrue to all members of the system.
For Krasner, the benefits are instead asymmetrical. Developed states tend to benefit
somewhat at the expense of others under hegemony.
For world systems theorists, the modem world system in general is
structured in a manner that benefits the core
peripheral states.
hegemon.

states to the detriment of the

This is true whether or not the system is

dominated by a

There is a cycle which moves from unicentricity to multicentricity,

and back again.

Under both unicentric and multicentric orders, the core states

gain at the expense of the peripheral, and often the semi-peripheral, states.
difference between the forms

of organization is that under hegemony,

unicentricity, the system is held to be more stable.

The
or

There are fewer conflicts

among core states, and trade is generally open.
In conclusion, all of the major theorists who discuss hegemonic stability
describe the operation of hegemony itself under the same basic terms.

This is

quite astounding, given the radically different perspectives the theorists represent.
The basic conditions under which a hegemon will rise or fall are similar for all
of these theorists.
is a hegemon.

All maintain that the system will be most stable when there

Nonetheless, on the matter of who benefits, and to what extent,

there are indeed deep divergences.
in Chapter Five.

This matter will be discussed in greater detail
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A Case-Study Examination of Hegemonic Stability Theory

One of the problems in examining hegemonic stability theory is that there
is no systematic data on the trade policies of states, in terms of the degree to
which they are open or closed (this problem will be discussed more fully in
Chapter Three).

However, it is generally possible, through careful research, to

determine the general commercial posture of individual states, or individual ports.
One potentially promising way to test hegemonic stability is through such an
analysis of the trade policies of specific

states or ports over time.

The trade

policies may then be viewed

in terms of the extent to which the world system

is dominated by a hegemon.

If the theory of hegemonic stability is correct, the

commercial policies of the states or ports should be relatively open when the
w orld system is dominated by a hegemon, and relatively restricted, or closed,
when it is not.
A n obvious problem with the method outlined above is that the results of
such an analysis may not be generalized for the system as a whole, unless a
rather large group of states or ports are included in the analysis. Unfortunately,
this would indeed be quite a major task.

Nonetheless, such a study, even of a

small group of states or ports, could provide a useful beginning, which could then
be followed with the application of the same method to the commercial policy of
additional states or ports.
Fred Lawson has endeavored to undertake such a study. Specifically, Lawson
set out to test the theory of hegemonic stability by examining the nineteenth
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century trade policies of three Arabian port-cities:

Muscat, Aden, and Mocha.

Although he does not make it completely clear why he chose these three particular
ports as the focus of his study, he does point out that all three were important
trading centers between 1800 and 1905, with "extensive relations with European
powers throughout this period” (Lawson 1983: 321).

It is Lawson’s contention

that the relationship between hegemony and free trade in the commercial affairs
of these states was not what the theory of hegemonic stability (or the mercantilist
perspective, as Lawson also calls it) suggests.
I will examine Lawson’s findings and conclusions for each of the three
ports, beginning with the Omani port of Muscat.

Lawson states that the years

in which "an open international trading order operated around Muscat do not
coincide with either period (see below) of British predominance in the area"
(Lawson 1983: 322), offering the following summary of commercial affairs
during

the

course

of

the

condominium or perhaps

1800s:

1800-1825:

years

of

British-Omani

indirect British predominance in the Arabian

Sea

accompanied by substantial controls on Oman’s foreign and domestic trade.
1825-1845: years of persistent and growing challenges to Britain’s position in
the area with some relaxation of commercial restrictions in Omani territories.
1860-1885: years of considerably greater competition at Muscat among Western
commercial powers associated with the gradual abandonment of trading controls
and the granting of m ost-favored-nation status to virtually all foreign interests.
1870-1885: years in which an open international trading structure was in place
at Muscat.

1890-1905: years of growing British predominance and a gradual

constriction of foreign commerce at the port.
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I will not question Lawson’s summary that is presented above, but rather
his conclusions.
the point.

His statement regarding British predominance in the area misses

By his own definition, hegemonic stability theory, or the mercantilist

perspective, holds that
whenever there is no single clearly predominant power
in

the w orld but rather a number of different

countries that are relatively equal in terms of economic
capabilities

and

level

of

technological

development...trade will be generally restricted

and

states will tend to adopt a variety of more or less
protectionist measures in their dealings with each other
(Lawson 1983: 317).
Herein lies a major discrepancy.

Lawson considers openness in the mercantilist

perspective to be predicated upon the existence of one clearly predominant power
in the world.

Yet, as w e have seen, his analysis of the commercial policy of

Muscat, as well as that of Aden and Mocha, is based upon changes in the periods
of "British predominance in the area," not upon Britain’s position in the world
relative to that of other powers.

Lawson’s own definition of the mercantilist

perspective is not based upon "predominance in the area," but rather upon
predominance in the world. He does indeed provide substantial evidence that trade
opennessdecreased as British predominance in the area increased, but this does not
run counter to the mercantilist perspective as he suggests.
I will briefly reexamine the trade policy of Muscat, utilizing the historical
information presented by Lawson, but substituting Lawson’s own definition of
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the mercantilist perspective, rather than his later used concept of predominance
in the area:

1800-1825.

British power was increasing rapidly, but had not

reached the levels it would later in the century. Substantial controls remained on
trade in the Omani territories. 1825-1845.

British power was increasing relative

to that of other major powers; some relaxation of commercial restrictions in
Omani territories took place.

1860-1885.

British power reached its height in

this period (the period around 1870 is generally considered to have been the time
at which British power reached its apex).
at Muscat.

1890-1905.

An open trading structure was in place

British power began a gradual decline relative to other

powers after the early 1870s, and by the early 1890s had lost substantial ground
to other states, particularly the U.S., and France. A gradual constriction of foreign
commerce at the port took place.
The historical evidence presented by Lawson for Muscat thus may be
interpreted as supporting the theory of hegemonic stability, rather than contradicting
it.

A t the height of British world power, an open trading structure was in place

at Muscat.

As British power in the world waned, Britain began restricting trade

at the port, as it set up trade agreements that better served British interests, with
much of the pervious British competitive advantage now gone.
Lawson’s analysis of the ports of Aden and Mocha produced results very
similar to those for Muscat.
"substantial

restriction"

predominance.

on

He notes that from 1839 to 1850, there was
the

commerce

of

Aden,

despite

strong

British

By contrast, he notes that in the period of 1850 to 1890,

restrictions were gradually relaxed, although there were growing challenges to
British predominance (Lawson 1983: 3 2 7 -3 2 8 ).

Again, the restrictions were
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relaxed when British power was highest, at least in the period from 1850 to
1870.

In the case of Mocha, Lawson states that from 1820 to 1830, Britain

dominated the port’s commercial affairs; sometimes restricting trade and sometimes
opening it up.

However, he states that from 1845 through 1880, years of

renewed Western competition, the port maintained restrictive trade practices.
Lawson concludes that for both Aden and Mocha, as for Muscat, no
relationship could be "found between the presence of a hegemonic power and the
existence of an open trading structure..." (Lawson 1983: 328).

It is true that for

Aden, as well as for Muscat, the trading structure was indeed not open when the
British presence in the area was strongest, but was generally open when British
power in the world was greatest.

Therefore, as was the case with Muscat, the

trading policies of Aden seem to give support to the theory of hegemonic stability,
rather than the contrary as Lawson suggests. By contrast, Lawson’s findings for
Mocha do indeed seem not to be in accord with the theory.

The trading structure

was closed at the time when British power in the world was greatest.
Lawson sums up his findings as follows:
First, it does not appear that the presence of a
predominant military-economic power is required in
order

for

unrestricted

established or maintained.

commercial

orders

to

be

Free trading arrangements

among countries do not seem to demand the existence
of a strong actor willing and able to provide the
collective goods that mercantilists claim are necessary
if such orders are to function effectively.

On the
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contrary, on the basis of the historical data reported
here it seems considerably more likely that open
trading structures will emerge under conditions of
regional or global competition than that they will be
associated with political hegemony (Lawson 1983:
330).
As I have shown through my reinterpretation of the trade information for
three Arabian ports, Lawson’s assertion that open trading structures seem more
likely to be in place where there is not hegemony is not wholly tenable on the
basis of these cases.

Indeed, the preponderance of evidence seems to run in the

other direction; free trading structures were most often in place for the ports when
British power in the world was greatest.

Nonetheless, this reinterpretation of

Lawson’s study does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that hegemonic
stability theory is, in fact, correct in its most basic tenant; that free trade
structures are most likely (o r perhaps only possible) under hegemony.

It does,

however, provide sufficient evidence to conclude that Lawson’s findings are not
in themselves a sufficient basis upon which to include that hegemonic stability
theory is invalid.
interpretation.

The data may be interpreted quite differently from Lawson’s

The evidence is inconclusive.

Lawson’s w ork amply demonstrates

the difficulties involved in determining through systematic means exactly what the
relationship is between hegemonic power and system openness.
In Chapter Three I will discuss some of the basic predictions derived from
hegemonic stability as to what affect the erosion of U.S. hegemony is likely to
have on the international economy, particularly with regard to market openness.

50
Also, some of the central aspects of the international trade regime in the post
World War II world are discussed.

I

Chapter Three

In this chapter, I will consider the predictions of advocates of hegemonic
stability theory with regard to the structure of the world economic order after
the fall of a hegemon.

As I have noted above, there are some noteworthy

differences among the specific versions of hegemonic stability theory advocated
by various theorists.

As would be expected given this fact, predictions for the

future based upon the utilization of hegemonic stability theory as a predictive
tool vary considerably.
This chapter will also present a brief examination of U.S. international
economic policy in the post World War II period, particularly with regard to the
maintenance of an open international economic order.

A n understanding of the

basic direction of U.S. international economic policy during this period is essential,
not only in understanding the nature of American hegemony, but also to making
predictions about the future of the international economic order.

Predictions of Hegemonic Stability Theorists for a Post-Hegemonic World

Robert Keohane (Keohane 1984: 9) and Robert Gilpin both point out that
hegemonic powers have in each case been the result of a world war.1

1 Nonetheless, it is not the case that every major international war
will result in the emergence of a new hegemon.
World War I, for
example, did not result in such an emergence. Nonetheless, it is sometimes
maintained that the World War I and World War II were actually both part
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For
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example, Great Britain became a hegemon only with the end of the Napoleonic
wars.
II.

The U.S. became a hegemon after, and partly as a result of, World War

Whether or not the U.S. could have, or would have, become a hegemon had

World War II not occurred is a matter for scholarly debate.

Nonetheless, it is

doubtless the case that the U.S. would not have dominated the w orld political
economy nearly so thoroughly as it did had the war not taken place.

Certainly,

the European powers would have remained as much larger and potent powers,
particularly economic powers, during the period running roughly from the end of
the war until the early 1970s, when the U.S. was predominant by a large margin.
This, in turn, would have resulted in the U.S. not having been as readily able to
shape the international economic order according to its own terms.
Robert Gilpin states that
Throughout history the primary means of resolving
disequilibrium between the structure of the international
system and the redistribution of power has been war,
more particularly, what we shall call a hegemonic war
(Gilpin 1981: 197).
A hegemonic war is one which drastically alters the relative standings of the
powers in the international political/economic system.

Gilpin ultimately concludes

that it is not inevitable that the present world order will eventually disintegrate

of one protracted struggle for system realignment; utilizing this perspective,
it could be argued that these wars together ultimately led to the emergence
of a new hegemon. In this regard, it needs to be noted that World War
I played an important role in strengthening the position of the U.S. v is a -v is the large European powers, although the U.S. did not emerge as a
hegemon at the end of the war.
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into hegemonic war, although noting that it is certainly a strong possibility.
While he does suggest that there are various factors that may serve to stabilize
the system over the coming decades, he does not directly address the question of
how stability may be maintained in the long-term (Gilpin 1981: 2 3 4 -2 4 4 ).
After making a strong structural argument to demonstrate that hegemonic war has
always been the major means of system adjustment, he suggests that this may be
avoided, but does not make it at all clear how this might be accomplished.

Keohane argues that while there is some validity to the proposition that
hegemony
can facilitate a certain type of cooperation, ... there is
little reason to believe that hegemony is either a
necessary or a sufficient condition for the emergence
of cooperative relationships (Keohane 1984: 31).
Indeed, Keohane maintains that a central tenant of hegemonic stability theory is
erroneous, arguing that
...cooperation does not necessarily require the existence
of a hegemonic leader after international regimes have
been established.

Post-hegemonic cooperation is also

possible (Keohane 1984: 32).
This assertion represents an interesting twist in the conventional understanding
of hegemonic stability theory.

The phrase quoted above "...after international

regimes have been established" is key in this context.

Keohane is here asserting

that cooperation can take place without the presence of a hegemon, but nonetheless
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maintains that this is the case only if international regimes have already been
established.

The clear implication is that such regimes may be established only

through the leadership of a hegemon.

Therefore, in Keohane’s version of the

theory, a hegemon is necessary for the establishment, but not the maintenance, of
cooperation.
Not surprisingly, given his version of hegemonic stability theory as stated
above, Keohane believes that there is at least a possibility of continued cooperation
in the world today.

Despite the fact that the U.S. no longer serves as a

hegemon, and despite his realization that no other nation is in a position to fill
this role, he believes that the extent regimes may be a sufficient basis upon which
cooperation may be continued.2
Of course, it is impossible to fully determine whether this is the case, except in
hindsight, given that regimes, such as the extent international trade regime,

may

continue to w ork in the short term v is -a -v is the maintenance of stability, but
nonetheless gradually break down.

It should be remembered in this context that,

as I noted in Chapter Two, different regimes certainly may have an affect upon
one another; thus, it may well take the maintenance of a number of regimes in
order for stability to be maintained in any given issue area, such as the area of
international trade.

2 For example, with regard to international trade, Keohane maintains
that the presently existing international trade regime, incorporating
components such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, may provide a sufficient basis
upon which cooperation may be maintained.
His assumption is that an
open international economic policy would be a central result of such
cooperation.
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Finally, two important points need to be made.

First, as we have seen,

regimes may be captured by various parties in order to serve aims that are quite
different from those that were originally intended. Whether this is good or bad
varies, of course, from case to case; generally the question of "good for whom?"
must also be asked.

For example,

the United Nations Educational, Scientific,

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) initially was strongly supported by the U.S.
The major powers, particularly the U.S., exercised a considerable degree of control
over the policies of this organization.

However, in recent years, the large group

of non-aligned, less developed states in the United Nations have come to wield
substantial influence over the direction of UNESCO policy. This change is viewed
very positively by most of the less developed states, but very negatively by most
of the more developed states.

The Reagan Administration even went so far as

to discontinue U.S. support for UNESCO due to its dissatisfaction with UNESCO
policies resulting from the influence of less developed countries.
Second, while there may be regime lag due to inertia, such that regimes
may outlast the structural conditions of the world political economy under which
they were established, regime lag and regime perpetuation are two entirely different
matters.

The institutions and patterns of behavior established by a hegemon may

linger for some time after the fall of a hegemon, but it is not clear how long
they may last.

Whether or not regimes may last in the long term without the

presence of a hegemon remains an open question.
The views of Charles Kindleberger regarding a post-hegemonic world differ
considerably from those of Keohane.

Kindleberger, by contrast with Keohane,

sees little possibility in there being a stable world political economy without one
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nation, the hegemon, acting as the stabilizer through the exercise of a "leadership"
role.

He briefly discusses several other potential bases of economic organization,

but ultimately concludes that none of these forms are likely to w ork properly.
First, Kindleberger considers the possibility of the international system being
stabilized through altruism on the part of the states.

This, he concludes, is not

tenable, principally due to the problem of free riding:
...unfortunately,

the

temptation

omnipresent, and when

to

free

ride

is

some critical number or

proportion of countries yield to it, the production for
the public good ceases (Kindleberger 1976: 19).
For example, in the present world, international monetary policy cannot be
managed readily, due, in large part, to the extreme volatility of the international
currency markets.

Kindleberger argues that m ost countries are not willing to

bear any of the costs of changing this situation.

He thus concludes that the

pressure of self-interest is ultimately too strong for countries, although particularly
for poor countries (Kindleberger 1976: 20).

As we saw in Chapter One,

Kindleberger’s western bias is quite strong indeed.
Kindleberger also briefly discusses the possibility of the international system
being organized on the basis of "enlightened self-interest," but concludes that this
also cannot work, primarily due to states seeking short-term advantage.

Again,

Kindleberger makes an implicit assumption that all states, including what he calls
the poor states, should favor various principles of liberal economics, particularly
free trade.

Although he does not make the point directly, it is clear that in his

view not to do so is act irrationally.
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Kindleberger further suggests the possibility of an "international economy
managed by rules," but concludes that this form of organization will not work,
principally for two reasons.

There "may be difficulties:

first in agreeing on

explicit rules or the content of the implicit rules, and second in their application
to particular cases" (Kindleberger 1976: 22).

Kindleberger also discusses the

possibility of organization through regional blocs, citing, for example, the European
Economic Community, but determines that this cannot work, primarily due to the
fact that "the regional-bloc notion fails to take account of the world scale of
economic issues" (Kindleberger 1976: 31).

Kindleberger clearly is correct in this

assertion.
Ultimately, Kindleberger determines that "leadership" is the only basis upon
which the international political economy may be stabilized.

He does suggest that

there is an intuitive possibility of a multiple leadership, such as a tripartite
leadership in the coming decades consisting of the U.S., West Germany, and Japan.
In such an event, these countries would stabilize the system by "uniting their
currencies

by

fixed

exchange

rates

and

coordinating

monetary

policies"

(Kindleberger 1976: 36).
Nonetheless, Kindleberger states that this type of leadership is unlikely to
work, for two reasons.

First, the leader countries may have too much trouble

coordinating policy with other powers; he cites France as an example of a power
that may well prove difficult in terms of policy co-ordination.

In all fairness,

such problems could well be encountered with a number of states.
Second, the different members of the tripartite group would be too likely
to pursue national interest - private goods, at the expense of public goods.

He
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therefore concludes that leadership by a single country, i.e. a system of hegemony
(such as the system of American hegemony after World War II), is probably
necessary in order for a system to be stable.

Unfortunately, given this view, it

is not at all clear to Kindleberger at what time another state will be both able
and willing to serve as the leader.

He ultimately concludes

Even if the emergence of a leader is slow, efforts to
evolve a system of rules and organizations should not
be, though their success is questionable.

A t the least,

perhaps,

order

one

can

prevent

the

old

from

disintegrating completely, even though one cannot
construct a strong new one (Kindleberger 1976: 38).
Stephen Krasner argues that the conditions that kept the system relatively
stable in the 1960s cannot be recreated in the 1980s, due to the decline in
American power relative to that of other states.

He states that the decline of

American power has tw o implications for the world economy.
international order is becoming messier" (Krasner 1982: 30).
and rules no longer serve as the basis for many decisions.

"First, the

General norms

Instead, behavior is

often according to ad hoc calculations of interest.

Second, the system is more

fragile; it is less able to absorb unexpected shocks.

For example, no state now

functions as a lender of last resort (Krasner 1982: 30).
exercised by the U.S. until the early 1970s.

This function was

Krasner further notes that even if

all of the states in a multipolar world believe it is in their best interest to
maintain an open regime, they may still not be willing to pay the costs of
maintenance.

Particularly when a shock occurs in the system, such as the shock
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resulting from the 1973 OPEC oil boycott, states are too likely to w ork to secure
their own

short-term

interests

(Krasner

1982:

30).

Nonetheless, Krasner

maintains that the system is not necessarily doomed to collapse (Krasner 1982:
31).

U.S. Economic Policy Post World War II

In order to comprehend the current state of the international political
economy, it is essential to understand the basic direction of U.S. economic policy
after World War II.
The two paramount goals of American international
economic policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s
were the economic reconstruction of Western Europe
and Japan and the formation of an open international
economic order premised on liberal economic principles
(Rapkin and Avery 1982: 5).
The U.S. set about putting in place the institutions it believed could serve to
stabilize the international political economy in a manner in accord with its
perceived interests.

Of course, the dominant ideology among American decision

makers was such that they maintained that the American world vision was in the
best interest not only of the U.S., but in the world at large.
thus

established

included,

most

importantly,

the

The institutions

International

Bank

for

Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), and the International Monetary
Fund.

The IMF was originally designed to help countries overcome short term
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balance of payments difficulties.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development, as its name implies, was originally designed to provide capital to
facilitate long term reconstruction and development (specifically in Europe).
Ultimately both of these institutions came to serve purposes rather different from
their initial missions.

The IMF is heavily involved to loans to less developed

countries that have financial problems that cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be described as being short term balance of payments difficulties. The
World Bank never was provided with sufficient funds to provide for the
reconstruction

and

development

of post

World

War

II

Europe.

Highly

industrialized countries were major clients of the bank until the mid 1960s
(Krasner 1985:

142), but the major clients since that time have been less

developed countries.

It is clear that even from the first the international economic

institutions pushed by the U.S. after the end of the second world war did not
w ork

in

accord with

their designs.

Nonetheless, the U.S. had such an

overwhelming economic advantage over the w a r-to m European states that it was
still in a position to determine the basic t°rms under which the international
economic order would operate, particularly v is -a -v is the question of openness.
The inability of the World Bank to foster the reconstruction of Europe eventually
led to the advent of the Marshall Plan.
William Avery and David Rapkin note that the creation and maintenance
of an open international economic order, promoting the free movement of goods
and capital, itself served to greatly increase interdependence.

They conclude that

"...the effects of interdependence on the United States have been inversely related
to the extent of its dominance of the international economic system (Avery and
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Rapkin 1982: 5 ).

It is important to consider that the hegemon establishes a

system over which it never has anything close to complete control.
In Chapter One, it is indicated that in order for the system to be
maintained, the hegemon ultimately requires the support of additional powers.
In particular, the support of strong secondary powers, such as West Germany,
France, Great Britain, and Japan, in today’s world, is essential.
compliance is needed among a number of smaller states.

Additionally

However, it has already

been noted that an order, once established, takes on its own dynamics, many of
which may not be in accord with the intentions of the hegemon.

Other states,

of course,

are even less in a position to have the order be even close to a direct

reflection

of

their particular preferences. Thus there is clearly a

relationship between the states and the order that they form.

circular

The collective

actions of the states, and particularly those of the hegemon, form and maintain
the order. However the order, due to its great complexity, may not be completely
controlled, and thus it, in turn, acts back upon the individual states, constraining
and partially shaping their behaviors.

Additionally, it has already been noted that

international regimes may be purposively co-opted for particular purposes that are
different from

those for which they were initially designed.

Certainly, for

example, the U.N. General Assembly serves a far different purpose than that which
the U.S.

and other major powers initially intended, particularly due

to the

increased influence of less developed countries in that body.3
Avery and Rapkin note that

3 Nonetheless, the major powers are still able to wield considerable
control over U.N. policy, particularly effective policy, through the use of
Security Council veto powers.
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...the United States, as the country with the largest
economy, and as the most prosperous and most
competitive member of the system, had the greatest
stake in long-term stability and order and, hence, also
the greatest incentive to invest in and sacrifice for the
creation and maintenance of a stable and open
international regime (Avery and Rapkin 1982: 9).
After World War II, the United States sometimes undertook policies that sacrificed
short term gains in the name of long term stability.

It was believed that such

a policy would be most advantageous in the long term interests of the U.S., in
security and economic terms.

The Marshall plan is perhaps the m ost important

policy implemented upon the basis of this reasoning.

Another example is

American acceptance of the protectionist stance of Japan, at a time when the U.S.
was the w orld’s major advocate of free trade.

It was understood that Japan

w ould be unable to develop without its domestic market being protected against
the importation of more efficiently produced goods from the U.S. and Europe.
Therefore, the short term profit interests were subordinated to long term factors.
It is clear that American policymakers are now less willing to sacrifice
short term interests.

U.S. economic policy is now oriented much more strongly

toward matters related to short term, primarily domestic interests, than was the
case in the 1950s and 1960s.

For example, almost all major decisions regarding

American fiscal policy are now made on the basis of domestic considerations; this
is quite different from the situation when the U.S. was serving as a lender of last
resort in the preceding decades.
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As the U.S. has lost economic ground relative to other core states,
particularly in terms of the balance of trade and aggregate size of the economy,
the U.S. has gradually moved to a stance where it often violates its previously
held principles of a liberal economic order, particularly with regard to trade policy.
Specifically, tariffs have been enacted against the importation of a number of
goods that threaten domestic firms.

Additionally, the use of import quotas is

becoming more commonplace.
It is important to realize that the systemic factors that lead to the decline
of hegemonic states are largely resultant from the policies of the hegemonic states
themselves.

In particular, the hegemon undertakes policies which serve to diffuse

its production technologies throughout the system.

This in turn serves to erode

the dominant economic position of the hegemon.

Ironically, in this manner the

open international order created by the hegemon serves as an instrument of its
demise.

Further, for both Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and the United

States in the twentieth century, the failure to invest sufficiently in physical plant
modernization played a major role in the erosion of hegemony.

Direct Foreign Investment

Direct foreign investment has figured prominently in the economic strategy
of the United States since World War II.

The U.S. has increasingly relied upon

direct foreign investment for purposes of meeting foreign competition, earning
foreign exchange, and solving domestic economic problems (Gilpin 1975: 8). The
use of direct foreign investment has major implications, both for the maintenance
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of hegemony, and for the degree to which international trade is likely to increase
or decrease.
As Robert Gilpin notes, an essential question which m ust be asked is
whether the U.S. is repeating a major error made by other, once great economic
powers, such as The Netherlands in the seventeenth century and Great Britain in
the nineteenth, "...of overinvesting abroad to the detriment of the home economy?"
(Gilpin 1975: 8).

As I will discuss below, the large-scale use of direct foreign

investment by U.S. - headquartered firms after World War II represents a major
difference from the British investment pattern during the period of British
hegemony.

This is significant, because it means that there is a substantial

difference in this context between the organization of the international political
economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the last period before
the present witnessing the fall of a hegemon, and the present international political
economy.

As I discuss in Chapter Five, this may be an important factor in

determining the prospects for the decline or continuation of an open international
order.
International investments made by corporations based in other countries
take two major forms:

portfolio investments and direct foreign investment.

Portfolio investments are investments in which the investing firm makes equity
investments in other firms, where the amount of the investment is not sufficient
to give the investing firm a controlling interest, or makes various types of loans
to foreign firms.

In each case, control over the firms receiving the investment

or loan remains with those firms.

In the case of direct foreign investment, the

investing firm either begins a new subsidiary in a foreign market, with the parent
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firm holding controlling interest, or purchases controlling interest in a firm that
is already in existence.

O f key importance here is the question of control; with

direct foreign investment, control is held by the parent company.

Therefore, the

ability of the governments of the host countries to regulate those firms is much
more limited than would be the case if controlling interest were held within the
host country.

For example, it is quite difficult for the government of a host

country to exercise sufficient control over repatriation of profits.

In general,

regulation of multinational corporation subsidiaries in peripheral countries is made
difficult due to the fact that there is often an implicit (and sometimes explicit)
threat that the company will relocate if it does not get its way.

This threat may

carry substantial weight in countries that are actively engaged in seeking foreign
investment.

Obviously, there are specific types of cases where this threat is not

particularly strong; situations where there are certain national endowments that
make corporate operation in a country particularly desirable (such as specific
natural resources), or an unusually strong internal market.
Although Great Britain did make some direct investments in the nineteenth
century, the majority of its investments were in the form of portfolio investments
and loans.

The large international banks based in London were at the center of

the greatest portion of British investments.

In general, direct foreign investment

was much less common in the nineteenth century than has been the case in this
century, particularly since the end of World War II.

The growth of direct foreign

investment has been strongly tied to the development of technology.

Direct

foreign investment became practical for many concerns only with the advent of
rapid

transportation

and

communications,

making

it

possible

for

a

firm
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headquartered in a given country to coordinate even the d a y -to -d a y operations
of subsidiaries around the world.
Gilpin notes that by the early 1970s, direct foreign investment accounted
for more international economic exchange for the U.S. than did exports (Gilpin
1975:

17).

In

1969, the foreign subsidiaries or U.S. based multinational

corporations produced approximately $140 billion

w orth of goods,more than the

entire production of goods of any other country

except the U.S. and the Soviet

Union (Gilpin 1975: 18).
While it is true that direct foreign investment has become an increasingly
common form of investment for core countries in general, until quite recently it
has particularly been favored by U .S.-based firms. Portfolio investments continue
to represent a larger portion of overall foreign investment for corporations based
outside of the U.S, than is the case for U.S. based corporations.

Nonetheless, this

probably will not be the case in the near future, as many foreign concerns are
engaging in increasingly high levels of foreign direct investment. Indeed, a number
of European firms, particularly ones headquartered in Great Britain, West Germany,
and France, and Japanese firms, are now regularly making large-scale direct
foreign investments in the United States.

The increasing use direct foreign

investment by corporations based outside the U.S. is certainly one of the most
significant global economic trends of the past decade.

Perhaps most importantly,

the global increase in the use of direct foreign investment has acted as a major
catalyst in increasing global interconnectedness.
It is important to note that the largest portion of direct foreign investment
is in the form of investments by one highly developed state in another highly
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developed state.

Obviously, this type of direct foreign investment is generally

undertaken for different reasons than is the case for core investment in peripheral
countries.

Labor costs in all core countries are high, so investment will generally

not be for this purpose.

Japan, for example, now receives little investment due

to labor advantages, with it now being a full core member, whereas such
investment was common there twenty years ago.

Instead, the major purpose is

to manufacture goods, or provide services for the well-developed internal markets
of the countries themselves, or to given regions.

Corporate subsidiaries are

considered as being domestic enterprises in the countries in which they are located.
Therefore, goods produced by those subsidiaries are not subject to tariffs in the
host country.

The advantages accrued by a corporation by locating in a particular

area may be particularly strong where there are tariff exemptions that extend
beyond one given country.

For example, there is a major advantage in many

U.S. corporations establishing at least one manufacturing facility in Europe. Goods
produced within the European Economic Community nations may be moved from
member to member without being subject to the higher tariffs to which they
would be subjected were they coming from outside.

The result of this is that the

location of a plant in any member nation provides access to a huge market with
reduced barriers.

This is one of the chief benefits to core countries of the

maintenance of a free trade regime.
Direct foreign investment in peripheral countries represents roughly o n ethird of all foreign direct investment.

It is important to recognize that in most

cases, direct foreign investment represents a substantially larger portion of aggregate
economic activity for peripheral countries than is the case for core countries.
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Also, we have already noted that it is generally particularly difficult for the
governments
subsidiaries.

of

peripheral

countries

to

regulate

multinational

corporation

In some cases the multinational corporation, taken as a whole, has

greater annual revenue than the entire gross national product of the country in
which it has a subsidiaiy.

For all of these reasons, multinational corporations

may often wield substantially more control over peripheral countries than is the
case w ith regard to less developed countries.

This is a major point of contention

for a number of less developed countries.

Industrial Decline

It is important to consider the question of why a hegemon eventually loses
many of the advantages that are central to hegemonic ascendance.

I have already

noted that some decline of the U.S. economic position relative to that of other
powers was virtually inevitable in the past few years, given the result of the
European economies gradually recovering after World War II.

Nonetheless, both

Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and the United States in the twentieth
century, made decisions (o r did not act at all) that had extremely negative
ramifications for their economies, and that served to hasten their relative decline.
Initially, a hegemonic power has a huge lead as a result of its technological
advantages.

However, in time, other core states are able to develop more

advanced physical plants and infrastructures.

In many cases they are able to do

so utilizing technology diffused from the hegemon as the base.
provides one of many excellent examples.

The steel industry

After World War II, the U.S. steel
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industry, with its more efficient production, rapidly outstripped the performance
of the British steel industry.

The British plants were considerably older and less

advanced than their American counterparts.

Therefore, it was easy for U.S. firms

to sell steel below the cost of British firms.

It has often been remarked that

Britain was extremely unfortunate not to have had more steel plants destroyed
during World War II; this would have necessitated the building of new plants,
which would doubtless have taken advantage of technological advances.
contrast, The Japanese steel capacity was largely destroyed in the war.
result, it gradually rebuilt the industry utilizing technological advancements.

By
As a
This

is a clear case where the diffusion of technology from the hegemon ultimately led
to the relative decline of one of the hegemon’s industries.

A central

problem for the m ost highly developed states is that the amount of fixed capital
is so high that there is substantial resistance to mass replacement.

Business

interests, particularly in the U.S., have a strong tendency to base decisions upon
a short, rather than a long, term calculus.

Under such a calculus, diversification

tends to be favored over plant modernization.

This has been one of the major

causes of the U.S. losing ground to other countries in the exportation of goods.
Nevertheless, this problem is present to at least some degree in all countries; it
merely has been more sever in some countries than in others.

This factor

probably has not served to reduce the overall level of international trade, since
one country’s loses tend to be balanced by other country’s gains.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Tokyo Round
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Before

proceeding to a test of hegemonic stability theory, the general

direction of recent international trade policy needs to be addressed.

In particular,

what is the likely result of recent international trade policy in terms of market
openness?

I will begin with a brief discussion of The General Agreement on

Tariffs

Trade

and

(G A T T ),

which is the most

important coordinator of

international trade policy.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was one of the cornerstones
upon which

the post World War II international economic order was built.

GATT, as originally drafted in 1946 was primarily an attempt to lower tariffs.
This was a response to the high tariffs that were enacted in the 1930s (de C.
Grey 1982: 7 ).

In general, tariffs were successfully lowered in accordance with

GATT provisions. Nevertheless, GATT has not worked completely in the manner
originally intended.

The drafters of GATT apparently did not recognize the extent

to which lowered tariffs would be replaced by other mechanisms designed to limit
competition from foreign goods.

The increasing emphasis of the U.S. upon "fair

trade," beginning especially in the early 1970s, was aimed at such limitations. The
anti-dum ping provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 provides a direct example of
the implementation of policy on the basis of a "fair trade" doctrine (de C. Grey
1982: 7 ).
The Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations, held in 1973, with
nearly one hundred nations participating, had an important impact upon policies
regarding international trade policy.

A t the meetings, a declaration calling for

renewed efforts to remove impediments to international trade was approved.

The

declaration asserted that the participating nations would w ork to secure "the
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expansion and ever-greater liberalization of world trade."

This was to be

accomplished through tariff reductions and through weakening other policies that
served to give unjustified protection to domestic producers (Quinn and Slayton
1982: XV).
The Tokyo Round declaration is heavily based upon a system of contingency
protection.

For example, under the Tokyo Round Code on Subsidies and

Countervailing duties, there are two provisions presented to enable governments
to deal with subsidies of other governments.

The first states that a country may

offset subsidies on foreign goods through the use of countervailing duties.

The

second enables country’s to file complaints with the code’s Committee of
Signatories in order either to have the subsidy changed, or to give a right to take
retaliatory measures against its negative effects (Barcelo III: 121).

The fact that

the countiy’s participating in the Tokyo negotiations found these provisions to be
necessary is in itself a tacit admission that there have been major breaks the free
trade regime.
GATT tariff Reductions apply principally to manufactured goods.
agricultural goods are either not covered, or at least are not covered fully.

Many
This

has been and remains a major point of contention between the wealthy countries
of the North and the poor Southern countries (Rangarajan 1984: 137, 138).

The

trade preferences of poor countries often run exactly opposite to those of the
wealthy countries in this regard; they wish to have there be more protections
against manufactured goods, but less against primary commodities, as their exports
tend to be principally primary commodities.

Import duties in the rich countries
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are usually zero for unprocessed material, but increase sharply in accordance with
the degree to which the material is processed (Rangarajan 1984:

141).

N on-T ariff Barriers

The principles of GATT continue are being undermined more and more
by the use of various n o n -tariff mechanisms, or barriers.

A n o n -tariff barrier

may be defined as
any

measure

(public

or

private)

that

causes

internationally traded goods and services, or resources
devoted to the production of these goods and services,
to be allocated in such a way as to reduce potential
real world income.

Potential real world income is

that level attainable if resources and outputs are
allocated in an economically efficient manner (Baldwin
1970:

5).

In recent years, GATT principles have particularly been undermined by the
increasing
such

use of various "voluntary restraints" or quotas.A good example

of

a "voluntary restraint" is Japan’s so-called voluntary restraint on the export

of cars to the U.S.; a result of strong American pressure.

This runs directly

counter to GATT provisions which disallow any quotas on imports from specific
countries.

It would appear that, taken together, the increased use of n o n -tariff

barriers would serve to decrease international trade.
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The steel industry provides a good example of an industry which has
increasingly been subjected to n o n -tariff import controls by the U.S.

in late

1983, the U.S. steel concerns persuaded the Reagan administration to impose an
import ceiling of 20 percent of the 100 million ton market for approximately
twenty varieties of steel.

A t that time, imported steel accounted for roughly

tw enty-seven percent of the metal sold in the U.S.

The U.S. then proceeded to

get tw enty-nine exporters to accept quotas roughly proportionate to their recent
share of total U.S. sales, by threatening to file various anti-dum ping and anti
subsidy suits.

Such "voluntary restraint agreements" (VRAs) now cover

semiconductors, automobiles, textiles, machine tools, clothing, and sugar, in addition
to steel (Peter Passell 1988).
In conclusion, there is a trend in international trade policy that is not in
accordance with a liberal international economic order.

According to hegemonic

stability theory, this is the direct consequence of the decline of the hegemon, in
the present case, the U.S. Taken together, VRAs and other n o n -tariff mechanisms
should serve to depress the level of international trade, or, at the very least,
should depress the level of increase of international trade.

Whether or not

mechanisms that have been put in place are, in fact, sufficient to cause trade levels
to decline in absolute terms will be addressed in Chapter Five.
In the following chapter, I will first discuss some of the problems involved
in testing the central premise of hegemonic stability theory, that the decline of
hegemony leads to a decline in system openness.
test of this premise.

I will then present a statistical

Chapter 4

Before undertaking an examination of the international economic system, it
is essential to determine what does, and what does not, constitute this system.
Specifically, is all international commerce regarded as taking place within a single
system?

With this regard, most political economists draw a sharp distinction

between a capitalist trading system, and a trading system

of states with

command-based, or centralized economies.1 The communist states comprise the
states in this latter category. There is a reasonable justification for this distinction,
at least v is -a -v is certain issue areas.

Communist states have generally followed

a strategy of removing themselves from the international trading system (aside
from trade among themselves, particularly in the form of trade among CMEA
members).

What

trade

does

take place with

other

states

represents

a

comparatively small portion of the aggregate economic activity of the communist
states.

This situation continues to the present, although some states, such as

Hungary, are gradually beginning to become more highly integrated into the
capitalist international trading system, with more trade taking place.

Nonetheless,

1 This is the only distinction that political economists generally draw
between countries in terms of global trading systems.
Reference is
sometimes made to specific bloc trading systems, such as the European
Economic Community or the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but
these are each, in turn, grouped into the larger capitalist or non-capitalist
systems.
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the effect of these states on the trading policy of the major core states remains
relatively minor.
It

must further be

remembered that Hegemonic

Stability Theory is

particularly concerned with the matter of market openness.

The purpose of

market openness is to facilitate trade operating on the basis of a "free market"
structure.

This is entirely different from the basis upon which trade decisions

are made in states with com mand-based economies.

Most of the trade decisions

in these states are made on the basis of long-term planning and are executed by
governmental agreements.

Therefore, the communist states are not included in the

statistical analysis that is presented in this chapter.

The Determination of System Openness

Trade controls including, but not limited to, tariffs, and the question as to
how much impact these trade controls actually have on international trade, are of
paramount importance to hegemonic stability theory.

Indeed, the central premise

of hegemonic stability theory is that openness will increase with the ascendence
of a hegemon, and will decrease with the decline of a hegemon.
I present an operationalization of hegemony.

Next I

In this chapter,

present a measure to

determine the degree to which the level of hegemony affects the levels of
international trade for industrialized countries.

In order to proceed, it is necessary

to establish exactly what constitutes market openness on a functional level.
On a historical basis, "openness" is used to describe a period when tariffs
are substantially lowered.

It is assumed that, all things being equal, lowered
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tariffs will result in increased trade.

However, as Stephen Krasner has noted,

tariffs alone are not a good indicator of structure (Krasner: 1976: 324).
factors are also important.
duties.

Other

Various no n -tariff barriers to trade can substitute for

For example, product quotas serve as impediments to trade.

Also, an

undervalued exchange rate may serve to make imports too expensive and therefore
w ork as a protective mechanism for the domestic market.
Even if one is able to determine the specific level of tariffs does not by
itself allow one to determine the degree to which trade will be facilitated or
impeded.

Tariffs do not have to be high in all cases in order to be effective.

Where factor costs are similar, even an extremely low tariff may be a major
impediment to trade. On the other hand, where factor costs are greatly dissimilar,
even a tariff well of 100% may have little affect.
in Chapter Five.

This is discussed more fully

Raymond Vemon has argued that tariffs, more than ever, are

now a poor indicator of trade:
With the tariffs reduced to

tolerable levels, the

ascendant

1970s

problems

in

the

included

the

proliferation of public subsidies in all their obvious
and subtle forms:

governments’ demands on selected

enterprises (usually foreign owned) in their territories
that the enterprises should limit their imports and
increase their exports, the procurement practices of
state entities, and the unilateral application of quotas
by importing countries (Vemon 1982: 482).
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Further, it should be noted that there are no reliable sources that systematically
report tariff data over a significant period of time.
to product subsidies and quotas.

The same is true with regard

Therefore, the use of tariffs or subsidies as the

basis for a measure of system openness would not be tenable.
Krasner suggests that because of the problems outlined above, a behavioral
measure might be a better indicator of openness.
proportions for this measure:
states.

He advocates the use of trade

the ratios of trade to national income for different

The world economy may be said to be increasingly open when these

ratios are increasing across time for most states (Krasner 1976: 324).
measure has an important advantage over other potential measures.

This

Even were

accurate systematic data on tariffs, trade subsidies, quotas, etc. available, this data
would not of itself be sufficient to provide a basis for the a determination of
whether the international trading system is structured in a manner that facilitates
international trade.

The important question is whether the degree to which

openness is maintained is sufficient for

international trade levels to increase, or,

at the very least, not to decrease.
Despite the substantial scholarly attention devoted to the theory of hegemonic
stability, little has been done to date in terms of systematically testing it.

Most

of the w ork to present has instead focused upon theoretical discussions of the
workings of the world political economy under hegemonic control (see Gilpin
1981; Keohane 1980, 1984).

Even Stephen Krasner, who has suggested the use

of specific behavioral measures in the analysis of hegemonic stability, has not
undertaken a systematic statistical test of the theory.
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It is entirely possible that the relationship among the factors theoretically
associated w ith openness, and system openness itself, will be found not to be
statistically significant.

This in itself would be an important finding, as it would

indicate that hegemonic stability theory is incorrect in its most basic premise.

At

the very least, it would provide empirical evidence that, even if the premise is
correct, the lag time is quite considerable.
Due to the fact that hegemonic stability theory is most concerned with
preponderance of economic power, the inclusion criteria for states to be examined
in this analysis are based upon two important economic factors:
and aggregate GNP

per capita GNP

(w ith the exception that states with centrally planned

economies have been omitted from the analysis).

The countries used were those

with the highest average per capita GNPs throughout the years included in the
analysis, with the following exceptions:
1.

Very small states with high GNPs, such as Luxembourg and Lichtenstein,

were omitted, as their overall effect on the world political economy is small.
2.

States that are not highly industrialized that have high per capita GNPs due

to the sale of a single commodity (specifically oil), such as Saudi Arabia, were
omitted.

The larger population states included in this analysis also have the

largest aggregate GNPs of all countries. Additionally, all of the smaller population
states that are included are among the largest states in terms of aggregate GNP
(though behind the large population states in the analysis) due to their large per
capita GNPs.

Nonetheless, there are a few states that are not included due to

their lower per capita GNPs, that do have larger aggregate GNPs than the smaller
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states that are included.

Specifically,

smaller states that are included are Norway,

Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Belgium, Australia, and Austria.
Spain is an example of a state with a relatively large aggregate GNP, that
was not included due to its relatively low per capita GNP.
noted in this context, as it presents a special case.

Italy must also be

During the years included in

the analysis, Italy, although classified as a highly industrialized country, had a
decidedly

smaller per capita

GNP than the other states that were included.

Nonetheless, its per capita GNP was decidedly larger than that of any of the other
states that were not included (excluding the very small states such as Lichtenstein
that were omitted).

It was decided not to include Italy, due to the large

difference in per capita GNP level.

Indeed, this difference remains currently, with

Italy’s per capita GNP currently being approximately three thousand dollars lower
than that of any of the states that are included.
In addition to the United States, the following countries are included in
the analysis (each country is followed by a listing of its national currency):
Australia

(dollar),

Austria (Schilling),

Belgium

(Franc),

Canada (Dollar),

Denmark (K roner), Finland (M arkkaa), France (Franc), Great Britain (Pound),
Japan (Y en), The Netherlands (Guilder), Norway (K roner), Sweden (K ronor),
Switzerland (Franc), and West Germany (M ark).

Data and Operationalizations

The data source for this analysis is the International Financial Statistics
Yearbook, published by the International Monetary Fund.

This is generally
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considered to be one of the most accurate sources for general international
financial statistics, including trade statistics.

Indeed, the collection of such data

is one of the central functions of the IMF. The years for which data are included
are 1957 through 1983.

These are the dates for which continuous data are

available in the 1985 edition of the International Financial Statistics Yearbook.
In the 1988 edition, 1983 is still the last date for which all of the data are
available for all of the countries included in this analysis (the 1983 edition is
used here because it includes continuous data for dates beginning three years earlier
than the 1988 edition).

This span of time is excellently suited for a test of

hegemonic stability theory.
hegemonic power.

In 1957 the U.S. was firmly in place as the

By the early 1970s, the U.S. had lost its position as hegemon;

thus, by 1983, at least ten years had elapsed with the U.S. no longer being in
the role of the hegemon.2

Further, the U.S. loss of position had continued

during this period.
It is important that the levels of trade be calculated as a proportion of
national income for each state, because without the inclusion of aggregate economic
activity, highly spurious results might ensue.

For example, a severe drop in trade

for a given state in a given year may be interpreted as indicating that there is
increased restriction of trade.

However, the drop in trade may be due to a

different factor, such as a national recession resulting in a general decrease in the

2 There is not complete agreement among scholars as to exactly when
U.S. hegemony ended; this is not at all surprising, as hegemony lies on
a continuum, rather than having absolute thresholds. Nonetheless, most
scholars agree that the period of clear U.S. hegemony ended in the early
1970s.
Many scholars pinpoint 1971 as the specific year, citing the
collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary accord as the breaking point.
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level of economic activity, including trade.

Therefore, ratios of trade to national

income are an excellent measure for the present purposes.

They offer the

advantage of allowing the international trade states to be examined, while
controlling for the effects of short-term domestic factors.

This will constitute the

dependent variable.
The independent variable will be the distribution of potential economic
power among the core states.
of state power.

Three state attributes will be used as a measure

These are aggregate economic size, per capita Gross National

Product, and relative share of core states’ trade.

Aggregate economic size must

be included, as it is one o f the major determinants of the extent to which a state
may influence the world political economy.

It is important to note in this

context that some of the m ost highly developed states, such as Switzerland, are
rather small in terms of aggregate economic size, particularly in relation to the
larger core powers.

Per capita income is extremely important, because it is

generally considered to be the best single measure of the level of economic
development of a state (certain oil producing nations that currently have high
levels of per capita GNP are an exception to this, but this is a rare anomaly
historically).

Share of core states’ trade is a crucial factor, as the rise or fall of

the hegemon’s share is a major determinant of how the hegemon will act with
v is -a -v is trade policy, particularly with regard to matters of system openness or
restrictedness.

The three independent variables are used separately, with one

equation for each variable, as they are all three more highly correlated with one
another than with the dependent variable; thus there is a major multicollinearity
problem combining the three in a single equation.
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Although no measure of military power will be included in the statistical
analysis, it needs to be remembered that the U.S. remained by far the predominant
Western

military

power

throughout

the

years

under

consideration.

This

predominance of military power is held to be a necessary, though not solely
sufficient for hegemony to be maintained.
In each case, the economic power attribute will be expressed as a ratio of
the American value to the next highest (or highest, where applicable), expressed
as a percentage.

The American value will be used as the baseline here, because

it is with the economic power of the U.S. (the hegemon) relative to that of the
other major core powers with which we are concerned for the period following
World War II.

However, in a few cases, the U.S. value will not be the highest.

In later years included in the analysis, the U.S. did not have the highest per capita
income of the industrialized nations.

This itself is one major indication of the

decline of hegemony.
In the International Financial Statistics Yearbook

many of the statistics

are given only in national currency units for each country; only select statistics
are presented in U.S. dollars.

For example, gross national product figures for

each country are given in the respective national currency units.

Indeed, there

is currently no data source which systematically reports GNP for all of the core
countries in time series in U.S. dollars.

Obviously, it is necessary to w ork with

figures that are all based upon a single monetary standard.

Since various figures

for the U.S. are used in all parts of the present analysis due to the U.S. role as
the hegemon, it was most practical to convert all figures to U.S. dollars.
course, the rates of currency conversion vary over time.

Of

Indeed, they may change
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from day to day. Needless to say, it is not practical to use a different conversion
factor for each day.

Indeed, even international agencies such as the World Bank

and International Monetary Fund do not find this to be a practical approach.

The

International Monetary Fund provides average rates of exchange for each year.
Therefore, in the analysis, a different conversion rate was used for each country,
for each year that is included.
For all of the countries included in the analysis other than Australia and
Great Britain, the International Financial Statistics Yearbook supplies figures in
period averages (by year) of exchange rates in units of national currency per
U.S. dollar.

For Australia and Great Britain, figures are given in period averages

of exchange rates in U.S. dollars per unit of national currency (IM F 1985: 6).
For this analysis, the figures for Australia and Great Britain were converted to the
former expression: period averages of exchange rates in units of national currency
per U.S. dollar, in order to facilitate the conversion of all national currency units
to U.S. dollars.
One important operational question that has to be addressed was the
question as to whether the data should be in the form of inflated or deflated
dollars.

If comparisons are to be made from year to year in terms of whether

absolute values of a given factor, such as absolute trade levels, are increasing or
decreasing, deflated dollars are been a necessity. However, for the present analysis,
the use of deflated dollars is not only unnecessary, but actually presents a
disadvantage.

The concern in this analysis is with changes over time in terms

of the relationship of hegemonic power to the level of trade.

Thus for each year,

the power of the hegemon is being compared with international trade.

One year
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is compared with another only in terms of the ratios described above, not in
absolute terms.

The key here is that both sides of the regression equations have

to be treated the same.

So long as this is the case, the ratios thus derived should

theoretically be the same whether the dollars are inflated or deflated.

The only

difference is that there may be a small amount of additional error introduced by
the use of deflators if deflated dollars are utilized.

Thus deflated dollars are not

used in the time series analyses.
It is important to emphasize that the focus of this research lies with the
international political economy taken as a whole, rather than w ith the individual
states comprising the system.

To the extent that we are interested in the

individual states, it is on a comparative basis, especially in terms of their relative
levels of economic power; specifically, the power of the hegemon relative to that
of the other core states.

The focus is thus on the system as a whole.

Obviously, the question arises as to whether our inquiry actually addresses the
system as a whole given that the dependent variables in the statistical tests are
individual states.
This may addressed with two specific points. First, by examining a number
of individual states relative to one another, we are able to determine much about
the constitution of the system as a whole at a given time.

Looking at one state

alone would tell us little about the international system, but looking at a number
of states can reveal much.

In this context, Charles Ragin points out that in

comparative social science, a distinction must be drawn between observational units
and explanatory units.

In the present analysis, the larger system is the explanatory
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unit, but individual states may nonetheless be used as data units (Ragin 1987:
8) .

Second, our primary interest lies w ith shifts in the structure of the system
over time.

If we make certain determinations about the system for a number of

years, w e may compare the characteristics of the system over time (Chase-D unn
1979: 611).

For our purposes, for example, we may determine how the overall

ratios of trade to national income vary among system members (core members
within the context of the present analysis) over time.
Time is an essential component of hegemonic stability theory.

One

dependent variable, system openness (expressed as the ratio of trade to national
income) is examined over a period of time.
form of a diachronic, or longitudinal study.

The present study thus takes the
Time-series analysis is a statistical

technique which allows us to analyze the international system with points of time
as the units of comparison (Hibbs 1974).
the basic system comparison points.

The years that are included represent

Time series analysis thus allows for the

comparison of the system with itself over a period of time.
The best technique for calculating a precise linear trend is least-squares
regression.

Following is the regression formula used in this analysis:

Yt = a + bXt + et

where:
Y = the ratio of trade to national income
a = a constant term
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Xt = the measure of U.S. power (Trade Ratio, Per Capita Ratio, and Aggregate
Ratio; each used separately in one equation)
et = a random disturbance term

Findings
To simplify the presentation, I have given shortened names to each of
the independent variables.

The ratios of the trade level of the state with the

highest level of trade, to that of the state with the second highest level of trade,
are called "Trade Ratios."

The ratios of the per capita GNP of the state with the

highest GNP, to that of the GNP of the state with the second highest GNP, are
called "Per Capita Ratios."

The ratios of the aggregate GNP of the state with the

highest aggregate GNP to that of the GNP of the state with the second highest
GNP are called "Aggregate Ratio."
First the relationship between Trade Ratio and the ratios of trade to national
income for each country included in the study will be examined.

The ratio of

trade to national income for each country was regressed on Trade Ratio.

The

U.S. accounted for the greatest level of international trade throughout the years
included; the United Kingdom was next highest from 1958 through 1961, and
Germany was the next highest for all remaining years (see Appendix One).

For

all but four of the countries, Japan, Australia, The Netherlands, and Denmark,
there is a strong statistically significant (throughout this analysis, significance
signifies p < = .05) negative relationship between Trade Ratio and the ratios of
trade to national income.

The R squares range from a high of .49763 for France,
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to a low of .24967 for Germany.

For the remaining four countries, there is not

a statistically significant relationship between Trade Ratio and the ratios of trade
to national income.

Throughout the time span for which data are included, the

ratio of the level of U.S. trade to that of the country with the next highest trade
level decreased.

According to the theory of hegemonic stability, this should

result in lowered ratios of trade to national income.

Exactly the opposite is the

case. In general, the ratios of trade to national income increased in absolute terms
throughout the time period under consideration.

This runs directly counter to

the theory of hegemonic stability.

TABLE ONE HERE

Next the relationship between Per Capita Ratio and the ratios of trade to
national income for each country will be examined.

The ratio of trade to national

income for each country was regressed on Per Capita Ratio.

For this

The R Squares are reported for comparative purposes only.
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Table One

Trade Ratio

Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
West Germany
Japan
The Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom (G.B.)
United States

R
.13508
.40092
.31787
.47629
.05374
.36462
.49763
.24967
.07801
.10046
.47676
.26762
.43116
.42159
.38613

Beta
.36754
-.6 3 3 1 8
-.5 6 3 8 0
-.6 9 0 1 3
.23182
-.6 0 3 8 4
-.7 0 5 4 3
-.4 9 9 6 7
-.27931
-.3 1 6 9 6
-.6 9 0 4 8
-.5 1 7 3 2
-.6 5 6 6 3
-.6 4 9 3 0
-.6 2 1 4 0

Significance
.0647
.0005
.0027
.0001
.2545
.0011
.0001
.0093
.1670
.1146
.0001
.0068
.0003
.0003
.0007

Yt = a + bXt + et
where:
Y( = the ratio of trade to national income
a = a constant term
Xt = the measure of the ratio of U.S. trade to that of the next
et = a random disturbance term

highest
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variable, the U.S. did not have the highest value throughout the period as was
the case for Trade Ratio, having lost ground during the time period under
consideration.

From 1958 through 1961, the U.S. had the highest per capita

income, followed by Canada.

From 1962 through 1972, the U.S. had the highest

par capita income, followed by Sweden.
highest level, followed by Sweden.
highest, followed by Switzerland.

In 1973 and 1974, Switzerland had the

From 1975 through 1977, Sweden was
From 1978 through 1980, Switzerland was

highest, followed by Sweden. In 1981, Switzerland remained highest, but Norway
was in second place.

In 1982 and 1983, Switzerland was highest, followed by

the U.S. (See Appendix Tw o).
For all but one of the countries included in the analysis, with the exception
of Denmark, there is a strong statistically significant relationship between Per
Capita Ratio and the ratios of trade to national income.

The R squares vary from

a high of .49031 for Norway to a low of .18454 for Australia.

For Denmark,

there is not a statistically significant relationship between Per Capita Ratio and the
ratio of trade to national income.
The U.S. level of per capita income, decreased in general relative to that
of the other countries throughout the period (despite a slight increase in 1982
and 1983).

Yet, as is mentioned above, the ratios of trade to national income

increased in general throughout the period.

The negative relationship between

Per Capita Ratio and the ratios of trade to national income runs directly counter
to the theory of hegemonic stability.
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Table Two

Per Capita Ratio

Country

R2

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
West Germany
Japan
The Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom (G.B.)
United States

.18454
.41713
.37136
.37764
.00829
.37319
.48997
.37316
.29286
.27804
.49031
.37200
.25986
.45454
.39487

Beta
.42958 .
-.6 4 5 8 6
-.6 0 9 3 9
-.6 1 4 5 2
-.0 9 1 0 3
-.6 1 0 8 9
-.6 9 9 9 8
-.6 1 0 8 7
-.5 4 1 1 7
-.5 2 7 3 0
-.7 0 0 2 2
-.6 0 9 9 2
-.5 0 9 7 6
-.6 7 4 2 0
-.6 2 8 3 9

Yt = a + bXf + et
where:
Yt = the ratio of trade to national income
a = a constant term
Xt = the ratio of U.S. per capita GNP to that of the next highest
et = a random disturbance term

Significance
.0285
.0004
.0010
.0008
.6583
.0009
.0001
.0009
.0043
.0056
.0001
.0009
.0078
.0002
.0006
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Next the relationship between Aggregate Ratio and the ratios of trade to
national income for each country will be examined.

For each country, the ratio

of trade to national income was regressed on Aggregate Ratio.

From 1958

through 1960, the United Kingdom had the second highest level of aggregate
income of all of the countries included in the analysis. From 1961 through 1966,
Germany had the second highest level.

From 1967 through 1983 (and up to the

present time) Japan was in second place.

Additionally, it should be noted that

Japan continued to narrow the gap with the U.S. throughout this period, as it still
is doing (see Appendix Three).
There is a strong statistically significant negative relationship between
Aggregate Ratio and the ratios of trade to national income for all of the countries
except Australia and Denmark.

For the latter two countries, there is not a

statistically significant relationship between Aggregate Ratio and the ratios of trade
to national income.

For all of the other countries, the findings again run directly

counter to the theory of hegemonic stability.

The R Squares vary from a high

of .89101 for Canada, to a low of .44194 for Japan.

As U.S. power measured

in terms of its level of aggregate income relative to that of other industrial
countries decreased, the ratios of trade to national income increased for these
countries.
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Table Three

Aggregate Ratio

Countiy

R

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
West Germany
Japan
The Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom (G.B.)
United States

.01284
.85894
.79631
.89101
.05933
.81128
.88960
.77760
.44194
.51708
.78160
.75149
.68457
.78386
.86469

Beta
.11329
.92679
.89236
.94393
.24357
.90071
.94319
.88181
.66479
.71908
.88408
.86688
.82739
.88536
.92989

Yt = a + bX{ + et
where:
Y = the ratio of trade to national income
a = a constant term
Xt = the ratio of U.S. GNP to that of the next highest
et = the random disturbance term

Significance
.5816

.0000
.0000
.0000
.2305

.0000
.0000
.0000
.0002
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
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Altogether, the results seem to provide substantial evidence that runs counter
to hegemonic stability theory.

As U.S. power, particularly economic power,

declined, international trade levels continued to increase; this is exactly the opposite
of what would be predicted on the basis of hegemonic stability theory. This is
the case not only in terms of hegemonic stability theory in general, but also v is a -v is Robert Keohane’s version of the theory which focuses upon individual
regimes.

Even when limiting the focus to international trade specifically (as is

done in the regression utilizing Trade Ratio), the results run counter to what
would be expected utilizing hegemonic stability theory as the basis for analysis.
Analysis of a sample of countries for which data are available through 1987
revealed no basic changes in these findings.
The final chapter presents a discussion of these findings.
their validity is examined.

The question of

Finally, the implications of the findings for the

international economic order of the coming decades will be discussed.

Chapter Five

In this chapter, the findings derived from the statistical test of hegemony
that is set forth in Chapter Four will be discussed.
whether the findings are valid will be examined.

First, the question as to
Second, a brief section on

prospects for the United States over the coming several decades, in terms of its
position in the international political economy, is presented.

This is of central

importance to the international political economy and the question of market
openness as a whole, since the United States is still the largest economic player
in the world, despite the relative decline that has taken place. Finally, the manner
in which current macro political/economic trends are likely to affect the question
of market openness and system stability over the coming several decades is
examined.

Validity of Findings

The finding that ratios of trade to national income increased for the
industrialized countries, as American economic power declined, suggests four
distinct possibilities.

The first is that the measurement devices utilized in this

analysis do not accurately measure that which they were intended to measure.
The second is that currency exchange rates are skewing the data in a particular
direction that obscures

the picture of what
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actually is happening

in

the
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international political economy.

The third possibility is that hegemonic stability

theory is, in fact, largely valid, but that the period of time required for the decline
of a hegemon to lead to a decline in international trade is much greater than the
forty plus years since the end of World War II, when the U.S. first emerged as
the hegemonic power.

The fourth possibility is that hegemonic stability theory

simply is invalid; that it is incorrect even in its most basic premise.

Measurement Suitability

It is, of course, always possible that the measurement devices employed in
an analysis do not measure the intended target, or at least that they do not do
so accurately. Although this possibility can rarely be completely discounted, I will
argue that it is highly unlikely ihat the findings in the present study are due either
to unsuitability of the devices employed, or due to measurement error.
All three of the independent variables that were utilized, the level of the
hegemon’s trade relative to that of the next highest, the level of the hegemon’s
Gross National Product relative to that of the next highest, and the hegemon’s
level of per capita income relative to that of the next highest, are considered to
be primary measures of hegemonic power within the context of hegemonic stability
theory.

Indeed, all three of these variables are widely used in general as

measures of the economic strength of states.

For this study all of these figures

were taken from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook, published by the
International Monetary Fund, which is generally considered to be the most reliable
source for such figures.

Although no figures of the sort employed here are
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perfect, it is highly unlikely that any errors present in these data are of sufficient
magnitude to lead to incorrect results.
The central tenant of hegemonic stability theory holds that international
trade will decline as a percentage of aggregate economic activity, as the hegemon
loses its position.

In fact, some versions of the theory hold that trade levels

decline on an absolute level, and not simply as a percentage of aggregate economic
activity.

As the present analysis demonstrates, at least for the period under

consideration not even the more conservative proposition that international trade
as a percentage of aggregate economic activity declines as the hegemon loses its
position is shown to be valid.

The important point here is that the ratios of

trade to national income are clearly appropriate as the dependent variables.

This

is a direct measure of the level of a state’s international trade as a proportion of
its aggregate economic activity.
Again, the data are derived from

the International Monetary Fund’s

International Financial Statistics Yearbook, a highly reliable source.

It should

further be noted that the data for both the independent and the dependent
variables are for major industrial societies.

This is noteworthy due to the fact

that economic data from the industrialized countries tend to be more accurate
than that from less developed countries, since the industrial nations generally have
the best systems for the collection and processing of data.
Finally, time series analysis utilizing multiple regression analysis is highly
appropriate for the task for which it is utilized here.
see Chapter Three.

For a more full discussion,

Taken together, the factors discussed above make it highly
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unlikely that the basic findings in the analysis are incorrect due to measurement
error.

Currency Exchange Rates

It is possible that currency exchange rates have operated an a manner that
skew the data in a given direction that may readily lead to misleading conclusions.
All data for this analysis has been in U.S. dollars, and therefore the analysis is
certainly sensitive to this factor.

Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the currency

exchange rates are leading to erroneous findings in this case.
It needs to be noted that the method of setting currency exchange rates
changed drastically during the period of years for which data are included in this
analysis.

For the first years of the data, 1957 through 1970, all conversion rates

were at a "fixed" rate, under the terms of the Bretton Woods monetary accord.
All currencies were pegged to the value of the U.S. dollar, which was itself
pegged to the rate of gold.

In 1971, the Nixon Administration removed the U.S.

from the gold standard, and the Bretton Woods monetary regime collapsed.

1971

began with fixed exchange rates still in place, but ended with a system of
"floating" exchange.

Under this latter system, exchange values are

fluctuating in accordance with

the perceived meaning of

constantly

various economic

indicators for each state, such as the growth rate, inflation rate, size of the money
supply, etc.
Only a drastic exchange value problem could case the findings in the present
analysis to be invalid.

Such a value problem would have to exist between the
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U.S. dollar and the currencies of virtually all of the other nations included in this
analysis, given that the findings generally hold for almost all of the countries.
Furthermore, there is complete scholarly agreement about tw o basic points.
U.S. economic power has declined relative to that of other major states.
the level of international trade has continued to increase.

First,
Second,

Thus, any exchange

valuation problems that may be present are not sufficient to alter the basic
direction of the findings.

Regime Lag

Next I will discuss the possibility that hegemonic stability theory is valid,
but that the erosion of hegemony leads only quite slowly to a decrease in the
level of trade will be discussed.

Hegemonic stability theorists have themselves

suggested that there may be a considerable lag between changes in the relative
power level of the hegemon and changes in the level of international trade.

This

argument is predicated upon the existence of international regimes that stay in
place for a considerable amount of time even after the conditions under which
they were created have been greatly changed.
As discussed in Chapter Three, a major focus of U.S. policy in the
immediate post World War II period was
international trade regime.
whatever

was

deemed

the establishment of an

open

There was a strong policy orientation toward doing
necessary

in

order

to

increase

international

trade.

Institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(W orld Bank) and the International Monetary Fund were initially designed to
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play major roles in the facilitation of such trade.

It is, after all, a truism that

sufficient liquidity must be present if states are to be viable economic actors,
capable of buying and selling in substantial quantities on the international market.
While it is true that these institutions did not serve the purpose of
supplying such liquidity particularly well, the U.S. did serve as the lender of last
resort during this period, and thus did provide much of the liquidity necessary to
begin increasing trade levels. M ost importantly, the U.S. was able to get the then
secondary powers, particularly France, Great Britain, and West Germany, to adopt
relatively open market stances.

Under the international trade regime thus

established, trade levels have increased markedly, as we have seen.

A t least to

some degree, this regime has outlasted the period of American hegemony.

There

have been some notable blows to the regime, such as the contingency provisions
of GATT and the increased use of quotas or voluntary restraints (see Chapter
Three), but nonetheless the market remains relatively open.

Trade levels have

continued to increase.
It remains possible that the erosion of the trade regime, to some degree
begun by the restrictions noted above, will continue.

While the erosion thus far

has not been sufficient to stop the growth of international trade, this may well
not be the case if the erosion continues.

As there is currently a general tendency

toward the increased implementation of restrictive mechanisms, it is quite plausible
that this erosion could, in fact, continue to the point where the growth of
international trade may slow; eventually international trade levels may decline in
absolute terms.

If this happens, it will support the basic premise of hegemonic
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stability theory.

It will merely have to be noted that the regime lag is quite

substantial.

Is the Theory of Hegemonic Stability Invalid?

The fourth possible explanation behind the finding that international trade
has continued to increase during a period in which American economic power
has been in continual decline is that hegemonic stability theory is simply incorrect
in its most basic premise.

A strong possibility that must be considered within

this context is that hegemonic stability theory may be valid v is -a -v is the world
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but not for the present world.
Certainly the structure of the international political economy is vastly different in
the last quarter of the twentieth century from its form in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.
The decline of British hegemony in the nineteenth century was accompanied
by (and at least to a certain extent caused) a last major wave of colonization.
Great Britain itself was, of course, a major player in this process.

In turn, a

series of restrictive trade arrangements was established within colonial groups that
were each headed by a single dominant country.
of the international market.
indeed highly unlikely.

This led to a fractionalization

A return to colonialism in the present world is

It is made so both by the nature of East-W est relations,

which would make recolonization quite difficult, and also by the extremely high
level of interconnectedness between the industrial states.

Many scholars argue that
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colonialism has ceased entirely to be a viable form of organization (Bergesen and
Schoenberg 1980: 263).
In lieu of a return to colonial organization, it has generally been suggested
(w ithin the context of hegemonic stability theory, as well as by World Systems
Theorists and Cycle Theorists) instead that the decline of a hegemon would lead
to some form of regional encapsulations.

Specifically, this refers to a situation

wherein the larger industrial states enter into exclusionary trade arrangements with
those states with which they are most predominant in terms of trade, thus forming
a series of relatively closed trading systems.

Aside from the geopolitical realities

that would make a return to colonialism difficult, this form of organization, with
dominant states having a preponderance of economic control over weaker states,
but without direct political control (taken to be unnecessary given the indirect
political control resulting from sufficiently tight economic control) is much more
efficient than colonialism in that it accomplishes the same basic goals without the
much higher costs inherent in the maintenance of colonial relationships.

This type

of arrangement is generally referred to as neo-mercantilism.
Nonetheless while some form of regional encapsulation is certainly a
possibility, there are

structural constraints in the present international political

economy that make this rather unlikely, at least in the relatively near future.
Perhaps the single most important economic difference between the nineteenth
century world and that of the late twentieth century is the degree to which the
major states and economies of the world are interconnected.

Although it is

certainly true that there has to some degree been an integrated capitalist world
economy since the seventeenth century, the degree of interconnection that exists
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today between legally autonomous states is unparalled in world history.
the degree of interconnectedness continues to increase.

Further,

This results in a degree

of interdependence that is quite far removed from the form of the international
political economy of the nineteenth century.
The increased levels of trade that have been noted are themselves indicative
of the increasing interconnectedness of the w orld’s economies, making it difficult
to even speak in terms of single economies in a meaningful sense.
important

to

consider the fact that most

trade takes

It is also

place between

the

industrialized states, rather than between industrialized and non-industrialized states.
Trade

between

industrialized

and

non-industrialized

important, represents a small portion of world trade.

states,

while

certainly

(It is interesting to note

that a much higher portion of U.S. trade is with non-industrialized states than
is the case for any of the other industrialized states.

Therefore, even if regional

encapsulation becomes technically possible, this will not be sufficient to maintain
the levels of trade to which the industrialized states have become accustomed, and,
indeed, are dependent upon.
Multinational corporations have played a major role in increasing the
interconnectedness of the economies of the industrialized states.

This, of course,

is not something that the corporations set out to do intentionally, but rather is
an unplanned consequence of the collective actions of corporations in fostering an
international business system within weak geographical boundaries.

Obviously this

would not have been possible without at least some degree of cooperation by
governments of the industrial states.

On the part of the U.S. in particular in the

post World War II period, there was an intentional effort to forge this type of
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an international environment.

Multinational corporations have served to increase

interconnectedness in two basic ways.

First, the increased level of international

trade that they have engendered has led to greater interconnectedness, given the
increase in regularized contacts, exchanges, and thus interdependence this entails.
Second, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of international firms
for which direct foreign investment represents a major portion of their economic
activity.

Few of these firms could exist as viable entities with sizes anywhere

near their current levels were they forced to rely principally upon a single home
market and perhaps a few markets in less developed countries.

Given the strong

symbiotic relationships that often exist between large firms and governments, and
given the large portion of the national economies represented by the multinational
firms, there is a strong impetus for governments to support at least a relatively
open international economic order, rather than to move toward the establishment
of closed trading blocs.
Clearly the degree to which the constituent components of a system are or
are not integrated is one of the central determinants of the level of stability of
the system.

For a political system, there is not a clear-cut answer as to whether

increasing interconnectedness will serve to act a stabilizing or a destabilizing
attribute of the system.

Nonetheless, the possibility that it may serve to increase

stability certainly needs to be considered.

A t the very least, a high level of

interconnectedness along an economic dimension makes the costs of system failure
considerably higher than would otherwise be the case.

If trade levels decrease

significantly, it will have a strongly deleterious affect upon all of the industrial
countries.

There simply cannot, for the foreseeable future, be sufficiently large
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increases in trade between industrial and non-industrial countries to offset
significant losses in trade among industrial countries. The non-industrial countries
do not have sufficient amounts of capital to make this possible.

Therefore, a

significant decrease in trade among industrial states will result in a substantially
reduced level of aggregate trade.

Prospects for the U.S.

It was virtually inevitable that the U.S. would experience some decline in
its relative economic position in the world in the past two to three decades.
After the end of World W ar II, the U.S. was left in an unusually strong position
relative to the other major states, which had been devastated by war.

As the U.S.

lost position, major structural adjustments have taken place in the world economy.
1

The U.S. ability to manage international economic policy has been greatly altered
as a result.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of the international

monetary policy.
In the international monetaiy regime the U.S. fostered after World War II,
the currencies of major countries ware valued in terms of U.S. dollars, and could
readily be converted to dollars or other currencies, as well as gold.
dollar itself was pegged to gold at a fixed rate.

The U.S.

This arrangement caused there

to be distinct advantages and disadvantages for the U.S. The primary disadvantage
was that it made it extremely difficult for the U.S. to adjust its currency value
(Jacobson and Sidjanski 1982:

26).

This could be particularly troublesome for

the U.S. when the U.S. dollar was overvalued, thus making exporting difficult.
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Other countries generally did not want any devaluation of the U.S. dollars for two
specific reasons.

First, it would make American goods yet more competitive than

they already were in the world market.

Second, since the U.S. dollar was the

principal reserve currency of the Western world, any devaluation of the dollar
would have had an extremely negative affect on the reserves of the other countries.
On the positive side

for the U.S., the U.S. was able to (and

balance of payments deficits without having to

borrow.

did) run

This was made possible

by the fact that corporations and governments would hold U.S. dollars as reserve
assets (Jacobson and Sidjanski 1982:' 26).
function.

The U.S. dollar no longer serves this

It is true that governments and corporations still hold some U.S. dollars

as reserve assets, but this is also true for other major international currencies such
as the British Pound, the German Mark, the Swiss Franc, and the Japanese Yen.
The U.S.

government

now

does

have to

borrow

to

finance

its

deficits.

Significantly, an increasingly large portion of the borrowing is taking place in
foreign markets.

This is important in that borrowing in foreign markets has a

decidedly different effect upon the home market than borrowing from domestic
sources.

Interest paid on domestic borrowing remains in the domestic economy,

and much of it is likely to be recirculated in some form of spending.

A much

smaller portion of interest paid to foreign sources will be recirculated within the
U.S. in this manner.

Given the immense size of the current U.S. cumulative debt

(approximately two trillion dollars), this will constitute an immense drain on U.S.
capital.

In turn, this will further limit U.S. economic power, and will thus give

the U.S. even less ability to determine international economic policy than it has
currently.

This decline of the U.S. economy will further limit the ability of the
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U.S. to maintain an open international economic order (whether or not it will
even attempt to do so, is another matter, which will be addressed below).
The relative decline of U.S. economic strength will also diminish the ability
of the U.S. to shape the economic policy of less developed countries.
includes, of course, policies related to market openness.

This is

As a result of the

declining relative economic strength of the U.S. there has been a precipitous decline
in the percentage of its GNP that the U.S. gives in the form of official
development assistance.

In 1965, the U.S. ranked third among the industrialized

countries in terms of the percentage of its GNP it gave as official development
assistance, w ith .58%, below only Belgium (.60% ) and France (.76% ).

By

1986, the U.S. had fallen to second to last in this category among the seventeen
industrialized nations (as classified by the World B ank), with only .23% of its
GNP going as official development assistance.
It has already been noted that direct foreign investment is on the rise for
a number of highly developed states.

Investment by non-U .S. based firms is

likely to increase in less developed countries faster than investment by U.S. based
firms.

This will further erode U.S. control over the economic policies of the less

developed countries.

Taken together with the decline in development assistance,

this will lessen U.S. economic influence in these countries, including in the area
of trade policy.

Europe 1992
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One factor that should have a significant impact upon international economic
relations is the unified European market that is planned for 1992.

This plan calls

for all barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and workers to
be removed by the twelve European Economic Community member states.

The

barriers would only be dropped v is -a -v is movement among the twelve member
states.

If this arrangement is fully implemented, the effect will be to a create a

single, unified market.
world.

This would make the EEC the largest market in the

It is important to remember that most of the EEC member countries are

highly developed core states.

Those that are not, Spain and Portugal (Italy is

discussed specifically in Chapter Three), are nonetheless states of a middle level
of development (sem i-peripheral), and are more developed than the majority of
the w orld’s countries.
The mere fact of the existence of a single market this large will itself have
a major impact upon the structure of the international political economy.

One

likely result will be the emergence of more European companies as strong
international competitors.

Since domestic firms in each EEC member state will

no longer be protected in their home markets, it will be necessary for many
firms to either merge with other firms or to enlarge through other means simply
in order to be able to compete in their home markets.

Further, firms will expand

to take advantage of their new ability to compete on an even footing in other
European markets.

It is interesting to note in this context that at the present,

1988, the beginnings of a merger wave in the EEC may already be seen, with
firms stating outright that they are merging in order to protect or enlarge their
market positions through preparation for the changes anticipated for 1992.

The
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result will be the collapse or submergence of numerous smaller firms, and the
concomitant

emergence of larger firms

marketing and

investment

capabilities.

with

greatly increased

international

This

will give European

firms

a

considerably greater degree of influence in the international market, thus, in turn,
strengthening, at least to some degree, the positions of the European governments
in terms of international economic policy.

To the extent that the European

Parliament is able to increase its authority within the EEC, this increased
centralization of power will be likely to strengthen yet further the European
position.

This latter point, however, brings up a crucial issue.

In order for the unified market to advance from a theoretical level to that
of practice, numerous specific pieces of legislation must be enacted by the EEC
member governments.

There are two central obstacles to this occurrence.

First,

there is considerable fear by some, both in government and business in each
country, that enterprises in their own countries will suffer too much at the hands
of the resulting increase in competition by firms from other EEC member states.
Second, the opening of the market will remove a great deal of authority from the
member governments.

In the process, the European Parliament will doubtless

increase its authority, although to what degree is not yet clear.
in loud cries from some, of the loss of national sovereignty.

This will result

A strong precursor

to this was seen in a recent speech by Margaret Thatcher, in which she decried
the loss of sovereignty that she maintains will occur is the blueprint of the
European Parliament for

1992 is strictly followed.

Thus, even given the

assumption that all of the initial necessary legislation is passed, there will continue
to be tension between the desire of governments, on the one hand, to build a
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strong centralized market, and on the other, to reassert whatever authority they
are losing.

If the latter sentiments win out, the concept cannot succeed.

Another question that is central to the plans for 1992 is whether or not
a unified European market, if it becomes a reality, will remain open to goods
from outside, or whether various barriers to outside goods will be erected.

Up

to the present, members of the European Economic Community have been able
to erect such barriers under the terms of Article 115 of the European Economic
Community treaty.

For example, under this provision the Italian government

currently limits Japanese auto imports to 2,000 per year.

Under the current

proposal for a unified European market, restrictions on goods from outside the
bloc would be ruled out.
There is some concern that nationalist sentiments in some of the EEC
member countries will eventually cause the bloc as a whole to place restrictions
on exports from outside.

Indeed, a number of companies from outside the bloc

are quickly opening subsidiaries in a member country precisely for this reason.
Goods produced within the bloc by these subsidiaries, of course, would not be
subject to such barriers. A number of leading European politicians have expressed
concerns about such nationalist sentiments.

For example, Otto Lambsdorff, the

head of West Germany’s Free Democratic Party, and a partner in Helumut Kohl’s
coalition government, himself a proponent of a completely open market, has
warned that strong nationalistic and protectionist sentiments, particularly in France
and Italy, could eventually lead to the erection of trade barriers.
clear questions remain.
reality?

Therefore, two

First, will the integrated European market become a

Second, if it does become a reality, will it maintain an open trade policy
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v is -a -v is good from outside?
one thing is quite clear.

Regardless of the answer to the second question,

A n integrated European market will be the largest in

the world, and this fact will mean that the balance of global economic power will
be significantly altered.

To the extent that EEC policy comes to be controlled

more and more by the European Parliament, rather than by individual national
governments, this will increase further still the EEC’s position.

This will result

in a further erosion of American economic influence.

The Future of GATT

The future of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade remains unclear
at the present time.

It has already been noted that the Tokyo Round resulted in

an increase in the use of n o n -tariff barriers to trade.

There is some indication

that this aspect of GATT policy will soon be redressed. This is quite noteworthy,
particularly given that this should not happen according to hegemonic stability
theory, given that the system currently has no hegemon.
The next stage of GATT policy is in the process of formulation at the
present time.

A t the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations of GATT, now in

progress, there is a strong movement toward the dismantling of n o n -tariff barriers
to trade (Leonard Silk

1989).

It is perfectly clear to all participants that many

tariff barriers have been replaced by n o n -tariff barriers, and a majority of the
major participants seem to favor the removal of these barriers.

If this effort is

successful, it will certainly have a positive affect upon the level of international
trade.

Ill

The New International Economic Order

In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly declared the need for a
"New International Economic Order."

This declaration, drafted and pushed by

the Group of 77 (an organization of non-aligned states now numbering well
over one hundred members), presents a rough blueprint for a future world order
with a structure quite different from that of the present.

As would be expected,

the general goal of the NIEO is to increase the self-determination of the LDCs,
and to decrease the disparities between LDCs and MDCs (Reubens 1981:

1).

The call for a New International Economic Order rests upon the concept
that the present world order is structured in such a manner that the gap between
LDCs and MDCs will continue to widen, rather than to narrow.

M any advocates

of the NIEO argue that this problem is caused primarily by willful exploitation
of agents in the MDCs.

They cite such practices of MNC firms as the charging

of overly high interest for loans to LDCs, undervaluing of LDC resources in
transfer prices*, and interference of foreign actors in local affairs.

However, a

number of advocates maintain that even to the extent that such abuses occur, they
are largely the result of larger structural forces.

For example, it is argued that

the market is structured such that there is competition for primary products from
LDCs, thus depressing prices, while MDC products incorporating higher levels of
processing or manufacturing tend to be controlled by oligopoly (Reubens 1981:
8).

Regardless of whether their focus is more upon individual agents or upon

the market as a whole, all proponents of the NIEO agree that the market needs
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to be reorganized.

W ith regard to many products, there is a preference for

authoritative allocation, rather than for allocation according to "free market"
principles.
Not surprisingly, the MDCs have been singularly unsympathetic toward the
NIEO Demands.

Representatives from MDCs generally insist that authoritative

allocation must be rejected, as this is anathema to the principal of a "free market."
It is maintained that the free market remains the most efficient means for the
distribution of global resources.

Of course, the question of "most efficient for

whom" is generally left out of this equation.

There seems to be little chance that

most LDCs will, within the foreseeable future, be able to significantly increase
their position in the global international stratification system through
participation in the extent market system.

This would be the case even were

free trade really in place, given LDC competitive disadvantages, but is even more
so given that there are so many protective barriers against processed goods from
the LDCs.

This argument between MDCs and LDCs over the means of resource

allocation to be utilized will doubtless remain the most contentious issue in
N orth-South relations.

Hegemonic War

In the past, the dissolution of a hegemonic system may well have led to
a system disequilibrium that would be solved only by a hegemonic war.

Robert

Gilpin is certainly correct in his assertion, quoted in Chapter Two, that throughout
history war has been the primary means for resolving system disequilibrium and
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for redistributing power.

Although hegemonic war still must be considered as a

very real possibility, it no longer may reasonably be considered by decision
makers as a viable means of power redistribution.

Without question, the advent

of nuclear war has drastically altered the utility of hegemonic w ar for such
purposes.

Conclusions

A major change has taken place in the international political economy over
the past two to three decades.

The United States has rapidly declined in

economic power relative to other major states.
present.

This decline is continuing to the

Indeed, in 1988, for the first time since the end of World War II, the

U.S. fell from first place even in terms of the aggregate amount of exports for
which it accounts.

West Germany is now the largest exporter.

This is an

astounding fact, given that this represents approximately four times the level of
exports per capita as that accounted for by the U.S.
This loss of economic power has been accompanied by a loss of political
power, such that the U.S. is not able to dictate international policy to the same
degree that it was able to in the recent past.

There is no significant evidence to

suggest that this trend will change over the coming decades.
The world of the coming decades will be one with a multipolar structure.
In terms of the West, The U.S., West Germany, Japan, France, and the U.K. will
remain the dominant powers, followed by the smaller highly developed European
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states, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. If current trends continue, power will
continue to be diffused more and more among this group of states.
It is difficult to determine the degree to which the international market
will be open in such a multipolar world.

As has been shown, despite movement

toward the implementation of some restrictive mechanisms, the level of world
trade has continued to increase up to the present.

Contrary to hegemonic stability

theory, there seems to be at least a reasonable chance that the market will remain
relatively open.

The decline of U.S. power has not led to a decline in world

trade.
There will definitely be strong forces in favor of closing the market.

In

the U.S., for example, there are, and will doubtless continue to be, increasing calls
for the implementation of protectionist policies as American firms face increased
competition in the home market from foreign firms.

If such policies are

implemented on a large scale, other countries will doubtless reciprocate.

Further,

the question of European market openness, particularly in light of the uncertainties
over the proposal for an integrated European market, remains.
It seems likely that E ast-W est trade will continue to increase, to the point
where it will truly represent a significant portion of the international trade in
which Western countries are involved.

It is, of course, impossible to predict with

any reasonable degree of certainty what specific effects this is likely to have on
the basic structure of the international economy.

However, it is reasonable to

assume that it will, at least to some degree, increase the aggregate level of
international trade, and along with this, the level of interconnectedness.
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Regardless of the direction in which the international economy travels in the
coming decades, there seems to be a reasonable chance that the market will remain
relatively open.

Certainly recent trade figures are positive with this regard:

in

1988, w orld trade increased by over eight percent, a figure that far exceeds that
of overall world economic growth.

There is evidence, presented in this analysis,

that a hegemon may not be essential in order to foster the cooperation necessary
to maintain a w orld with ah open international economic order, and, indeed, with
other cooperative regimes.
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Appendix One

International Trade (Highest and Next Highest)

High/Next

Total Trade (Billions $U.S.)

Year

High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High

32.536
20.230
34.649
21.395
36.982
23.643
36.989
23.803
39.516
25.619
42.027
27.648
46.984
30.940
50.763
35.525
58.225
38.324
60.459
39.307
70.105
45.183
76.530
53.728
85.936
64.175
92.911
73.540
109.111
87.114
145.684
122.454
209.427
159.029
213.992
165.106
247.900

1958
1958
1959
1959
1960
1960
1961
1961
1962
1962
1963
1963
1964
1964
1965
1965
1966
1966
1967
1967
1968
1968
1969
1969
1970
1970
1971
1971
1972
1972
1973
1973
1974
1974
1975
1975
1976

U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.

122

123
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next

W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany

190.584
281.643
219.530
329.811
264.208
404.253
331.450
477.770
380.863
507.091
340.004
467.160
331.805
470.416
322.382

1976
1977
1977
1978
1978
1979
1979
1980
1980
1981
1981
1982
1982
1983
1983

Appendix Two

Per Capita GNP (Highest and Next Highest)

High/Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High

U.S.
Canada
U.S.
Canada
U.S.
Canada
U.S.
Canada
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
U.S.
Sweden
Switzerland
Sweden
Switzerland
Sweden
Sweden
Switzerland
Sweden
Switzerland
Sweden

Per Capita GNP ( Bill. $U.S.)
2.571
2.092
2.744
2.193
2.803
2.208
2.856
2.142
3.029
2.182
3.153
2.317
3.323
2.567
3.557
2.796
3.846
3.013
4.024
3.244
4.352
3.421
4.658
3.687
4.841
4.140
5.819
4.497
5.650
5.279
6.609
6.400
7.636
7.091
8.869
8.740
9.511
9.272
9.988

Year
1958
1958
1959
1959
1960
I960
1961
1961
1962
1962
1963
1963
1964
1964
1965
1965
1966
1966
1967
1967
1968
1968
1969
1969
1970
1970
1971
1971
1972
1972
1973
1973
1974
1974
1975
1975
1976
1976
1977

124

125
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next

Switzerland
Switzerland
Sweden
Switzerland
Sweden
Switzerland
Sweden
Switzerland
Norway
Switzerland
U.S.
Switzerland
U.S.

9.982
13.894
10.986
15.619
12.973
16.555
14.824
15.362
13.474
15.623
13.226
15.711
14.093

1977
1978
1978
1979
1979
1980
1980
1981
1981
1982
1982
1983
1983

Appendix Three
Aggregate GNP (Highest and Next Highest)

High/Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High

U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
W. Germany
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.

Aggregate GNP (Bill. $U.S.)
449.700
65.408
487.900
68.768
506.500
72.744
524.600
82.172
565.000
90.125
596.700
95.525
637.700
104.900
691.100
114.550
756.000
121.850
799.600
123.508
873.400
146.397
944.000
172.272
992.700
203.133
1077.600
230.504
1185.900
304.493
1326.400
413.842
1434.200
458.511
1549.200
498.154
1718.000
558.740
1918.300
686.634
2163.900

Year
1958
1958
1959
1959
1960
1960
1961
1961
1962
1962
1963
1963
1964
1964
1965
1965
1966
1966
1967
1967
1968
1968
1969
1969
1970
1970
1971
1971
1972
1972
1973
1973
1974
1974
1975
1975
1976
1976
1977
1977
1978

126

127
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next
High
Next

I

Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Japan

963.258
2417.800
998.877
2631.700
1040.108
2957.800
1142.645
3069.300
1059.549
3304.800
1158.814

1978
1979
1979
1980
1980
1981
1981
1982
1982
1983
1983
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